Source: http://english.hizbollah.tv/catessays.php?cid=231   08-05-2008

His Eminence Hizbullah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah held a press conference today in which he commented on recent developments and decisions made by the unconstitutional government. It came as follows:

In the Name of Allah, the Beneficent, the merciful. Praise be to Allah Lord of the Worlds.

Peace and Prayers be upon Mohammad, The Last Prophet, and on his family and elected followers, and upon all the messengers and prophets. May Allah's peace and mercy be upon you all.

Certainly, the subject of this press conference that we hold which is the first since the end on the July (2006) war the important and dangerous developments that have been occurring for the past few days in Lebanon.

In the beginning I must say that after the decisions taken by the ruling party on that dark night, a completely new era has begun in Lebanon. Meaning that the date of that session to us is like March 14, 2005, the earthquake of the assassination of PM Rafik Hariri that sent Lebanon into an entirely new era. Lebanon after that dark gloomy session is not what it was before. The ruling party must know that it has entered Lebanon in a completely new phase due to the seriousness, backgrounds and dimensions of the decisions it took.

I will discuss several headlines:

First: The Resistance's communication networks. In this conference we shall call a spade a spade...the phase is difficult but it is also a phase for logic, thinking, and wise decisions.

Second: The airport and Officer Shokeir.

Third: The current severe political dilemma, dealing with it, and the way out of it.

In the first point I have a definition. In Lebanon people may understand what the Resistance communication network is, but foreigners might think that we have set up a private phone network and a ministry of communication which brings us proceeds illegally, and to answer the deductions made by the ruling party that knows the truth but denies it.

There is a code-weapon in all armies in the world even in armies in the past. Various codes were used, including birds and sounds among other things. Every time infantry and firearms and combat tactics developed, the code or communications developed simultaneously. Hence, any fighting group be it an army or party or militia or security team, all need communication between the leadership and groups and cadres and individuals. This weapon is an elementary part of the administrative organization and control if not the primary factor in any victory and battle leadership.

These communications take various forms and it is a technical issue. Hence, it is crucial that I mention it. There are various radio frequency communications such as a walkie-talkie and cellular phones in which sound is transferred by waves and they take several technological forms. There's also the wire in which sound is not broadcasted in waves. It is transferred in wires from one instrument to another and sound is usually confined. Usually non-wired communications are facilitated and easier, and every person can take his receiver from place to place. Now each of you can hold a cellular phone and talk from the street from any place you chose. It is not so with cables, not so flexible. There is a group of problems with non-wired communication, and I tell u, there is no non-wired communication in Lebanon or the world that is surveillance-proof and cannot be decoded and analyzed.

This is a fact given the technological development in the world. There is an issue of surveillance. Second, there is the issue of interference. The enemy may log onto the communication channel and jam it disconnecting the leadership from the cadres and bases and centers. In result, the entire leadership and control network disperses.

The third issue is targeting. Quite simple, a cellphone tower can be bombed. The wireless network can be bombed similar to what occurred in the (2006) war and in previous wars. Yet the wired communication network, especially if it is secret, is difficult to bomb in the first few days, and may be employed in a wider margin. We in the resistance do not have the capabilities of large armies or the technology of the USA nor the ‘Israeli' technology. Naturally, when we are faced with complicated advanced technology we resort to simplified technology since in the technological scale we cannot match. The best and most effective means to face complex technology is simplification. In result came the wired network. To be precise I can say the wired resistance network is a communication center and a group of cables connected to houses of leaders and centers and resistance related posts. This is the wired communication network. Wired communication is a part of the code weapon of the resistance in Lebanon. It is not a secondary weapon; it is the most fundamental one in the battle, and in any battle. Before the year 2000, one of the most important reasons behind the success of the resistance operations is that when 200, 300 or 400 resistance fighter attack ‘Israeli' posts in the occupied zone, the ‘Israeli' only knew about the attack the second the first shot was fired. This is because we didn't rely on wireless equipment, but on the wired network. In the July (2006) war the most important point, our greatest point of strength, was leadership and control because communication was upheld between the leadership and command centers and operational combat posts. The enemy admitted to this. Remember after the second Qana massacre when a ceasefire was agreed upon for 48 hours to facilitate the exit of the injured and others, how were we able to stop firing when we are not an regular army? It was due to our ability to communicate with all our points in those posts.

As to the declaration of the Minister of Information, and I regret this since he was an old friend, that it is wrong to consider that this weapon protects Hizbullah. I would like to say that many of our leaders have died due to wireless communications and cellular phones. And in the July (2006) war in many posts where we lost wired communication and were forced to communicate wirelessly and by cellular phones, cadres and leaders were killed in operation.

Today, when we approach the Winograd report we find that the most important recommendation by Winograd was the necessity to destroy the organization and capacity of leadership and control of Hizbullah in which the communication constitutes a decisive factor. This is the Winograd recommendation which we must not forget, and you can go back to it.

We come to the negotiations that were going on between us and the ruling party in the recent past. You all know that this (communication) network existed before the year 2000 and continued after that, and it is not a new or a recently introduced network. Yes, it is true that it has been developed and advanced, and this is a natural and logical issue. I would like to remind them that when we agreed with them in the sinister quadric-partite alliance that the network was existent then and wasn't a aggression of sovereignty, law, or public money. When the ministerial Declaration was made and talked about the resistance and its arms, and this is part of its arms, this network wasn't an aggression on sovereignty and public money.

Now, at this moment, the four-party accord is a dream, an illusion, the matter which angered some members of the ruling party. I pronounce that it is an illusion; they will not see it in this life or in the afterlife. In any case, we will not meet in the afterlife. Yet in this life they will never see it. After the Winnograd recommendations, and after Welch's recommendations and the ‘hot Summer', and after the Lebanese crisis was magnified and after (Terje Rod) Larsen and his report that is useless unless the Lebanese government says, "The Lebanese Government says..." ...and after the insulting report of the US State Department to the (Lebanese) government...the Government came and reopened the case even though in the past few months we were negotiating and had reached a certain defined agreement and had answered all the questions. They had come before and we had communicated, the subject was brought up and high levels of Lebanese security institution chiefs were put in charge of communicating with us and discussing the (phone) communication network with us and certain distressing issues. We met and answered their issues and they said, "Fine, you have addressed our issues and we have no problems, but there is a cable laid between the (southern) suburb and western Beirut." This cable was laid out in the July 2006 war a few days after the suburb was bombed and not on the first day; we laid a cable between the suburb and Beirut. They told us that this cable spurs fear from this person and that person, and hope u can remove it, and in case of a new war God forbid, we, the official security forces, vow to lay out a new cable. We agreed to that with our hearts, and told them if it relieves you, remove it, and we have removed it. End of the story.

The region is undergoing a phase. The issue is not about the wired network. There were gambles on the Government that lost. Certain gambles were put on regional and international developments that lost, lost gambles on wars. Therefore, the war in Iraq and Palestine and Lebanon and even with Iran and Syria was required to be waged in a different manner. They came and opened the issue of the wired (network). The officers came and a meeting was held. What's the problem? They said we have a group of issues you must solve for us. We are a people of negotiation and solving issues, and we want to keep our weapons. We don't want to fight for our weapons. Fighting is not our objective. They said we want to lay out a network in Jubeil and Kisirwaan. We told them that it is untrue. And the one (Jumblat) who held a press conference and lied for 25 years knows that he was lying. We informed the officers who informed the ministerial committee who in turn informed the unconstitutional government that Hizbullah says, as a matter of fact that it doesn't want to lay down a network in Jubeil and Kisirwaan, and we told them that we lay it only in places where there are leaders and centers and where there are targets. They said, "Fine, what about the North?" We responded that not even in the North. They said, "fine...And the line between the suburb and the South?" We answered, "It is natural. It is crucial since it provides communication between the suburb and the south." They said, "We fear you might lay lines to your allies in the Choof." We said, "We will not lay lines to the Choof, and we vow not to lay lines to our allies." This is the first time I discuss such information. We said, "Fine, There's no problem." They said, "One more thing. This network is a replacement of the Government's network and in effect it will deprive the treasury of proceeds." We told them that this network is for the sole use of the leaders and cadres of the resistance and is not for public use. And if you want to make sure, be our guests. They said there's a third issue, that this network may be used for making international calls. We told them that it isn't possible, and despite that, you can pick up any international call. Be our guests and tell us where the international calls are and let us deal with it. We believe that international calls of this sort are illegal and are deemed a source of dissolute money and a theft of public money. They said this is perfect. The officers went and said the atmosphere was positive and matters were going well. Then they came back and said we have a deal: we overlook your wired communication network in trade for stopping the strike in Beirut. They want a compromise to overlook the resistance's wired network. Here, I would like to ask: Had we accepted this proposal, would the resistance network have become legal and not against the law and a theft of public money? What kind of government is this? This isn't a government, it's a gang! It is not a government of law or institutions. It's a gang. It's not even a militia. Shame on it! It's a shame to use internal issues to overlook the issue of the resistance's weapons. It is a patriotic internal issue associated with defending this country and confronting the Zionist enemy. Second, the communication network's decision is mine, but the decisions relating to the strike camp lies in the hands of all the opposition.

The issue ended at this level and we provided assurances and showed our willingness (to cooperate) by saying ‘be our guests and come examine (this network) and see that there are no international calls on it and that it isn't for public use and that it takes nothing from the government given the fact that there are phone networks in various places in Lebanon for religious institutions and political parties in Lebanon some of which are licensed and others not so. Allah willing the members of parliament will soon reveal some details in relations to this. But apart from this side, this issue is related to the resistance, with the struggle with ‘Israel', and with defending this country. Yet the topic has risen to the surface again via the Prime Minister Mr. Walid Jumbtatt since it has become clear to me that it is wrongful to say ‘the government of Fuad Saniora' since Fuad Saniora is a poor employee for Walid Jumblaat. And when the latter wants to fire an employee he tells the employees (like Mr. Saniora) to fire them. Of course he (Jumblaat) is an employee for Condaleeza Rice...The Government of Mr. Walid Jumblaat has returned to stir up the topic again and waged a comprehensive attack starting from the camera and conluding with the airport. And it is possible the he (Jumblaat) brought the French Member of Parliament to the suburb. And on the occasion, have you any idea where the mp was arrested? He was arrested in the very alley of my house with camera taking pictures! Who took him there? A person from the Progressive Socialist party!
They took him so that we would arrest him! I tell you, we will not be merciful with the security of any of our leaders at all. They will say kidnap or detainment, not a problem. The issue was brought up and reopened and, hence, the government held a meeting and took decisions that you are aware of. This is what happened up to now.

The second point in the issue of the wired network is describing the decision. I would like to describe the government's decision after the report of the US Department of State which ‘insulted' them. They used the same phrase which came in the State Department's report. They are employees that abide to the text. Fine. A ‘hot summer' and internationalization and after 10 hours of calls made to the countries and capitals that covered the July War, the sinister decision was made which you heard of and which considered the Hizbullah's resistances wired network an aggression against sovereignty, and law and public money, and they requested from the judicial authorities and security forces to pursue everyone that is charged with establishing this network. First, this decision is a declaration of war and a commencement of war from the government of Walid Jumblatt on the resistance and its weapons and a commencement of war from the government of Walid Jumblatt on the resistance and its arms on behalf of and for the benefit of the United States and ‘Israel'. We have no doubts or confusion on the subject. It's as clear as the sun at midday.

Second: this decision revealed the truth of this party and its backgrounds, the truth of its commitments, and the truth of its behavior and performance during the July 2006 war the results of which saddened it (the party).

Third: This decision aims at confiscating the prime factor that protects the resistance's leadership, cadres and infrastructure, and aims at exposing (the resistance) as an introduction to assassination and death, and the destruction of its infrastructure. Hence they become partners in killing and assassinating even if by only providing introductions and opening the way.

Fourth: This decision is aimed at stirring discord between the national Lebanese army, security forces and the resistance after the failure of all previous conspiracies and collusions that were foiled by the patience, wisdom, attention, and responsibility of the resistance and the army leadership. Today they want to push the Lebanese army and the Lebanese security forces into direct combat with the resistance through assigning the issue of removing and disabling this network to them. This is our description of the decision, of course it is also aimed at providing subject matter for Mr. Larsen for the UNSC, supervising UNSCR 1959 so that it is not said ‘Larsen said...' but ‘The government said...' In its simplest terms this is our description of the decision. I wish not to venture regionally and internationally, and into Bush's visit to the region and very long commitments...

Our response to this decision is, naturally, that he who declares war against us and begins a war with us, be he a father or brother, it is our right to face them with defending our rights and weapons and resistance and existence. The wired network is the most crucial part of the resistance's weapons, not just a crucial part. From Bint Jubeil I talked about it and was clear and transparent during that election period. And I wasn't searching for electoral voices. The government's Prime Minister Mr. Walid Jumblaat was present sitting and swaying his feet around while I was giving a speech and clearly said, "The hand that extends to the resistance's weapons whomever it is for and wherever it comes from...we will cut it!" Today is the day of truthfulness to that decision.

The ‘Israeli' hand extended to the resistance's weapons in the July war and it was cut. In the interior (Lebanon), there have been attempts that have not yet reached the level of seriousness, action, and the commencement of a war. But after the gloomy decisions of the dark government we consider that a war has been waged and it is our duty to defend our weapons and resistance, and the legality of our decisions. "He who has warned is excused!" To us the issue has passed all red lines. There will be no lenience with anyone whoever it be wherever it be. We also know, and our information confirms that the issue of the wired network is but a first step to be followed by other steps. And if we are tolerant with the wired network issue, tomorrow we will face a battle on the missile and anti-armor missiles and on every capability the resistance has to defend itself and its country or to confront any future ‘Israeli' aggression.
Second: Te subject of judicial reference. This communication network is under the control of Hizbullah, and therefore Hizbullah owns the network. I, the Secretary General, am the owner of the network and its editor-in-chief, as the media might put it, and it's main financer, and I am a user of this network in which many loyal mujahidin worked implementing my decisions. Despite the illegal reference from the unconstitutional government and I don't believe in the legality of this reference, the Lebanese judiciary can send a judge in the appropriate place on the level of security and allow me to meet him, for I too have a litigation against those who took the decision that they have taken a decision in favor of the US and ‘Israel' and to ignite a civil war. Let the law (rule) between us. As to the rest, the people who facilitated, aided, and considered that they helped the resistance, they are untouchable, be that person an engineer, a company, a mayor, an employee, a contractor, a day laborer... Harming them is equivalent to harming me. Harming any cadre in the resistance in Lebanon is unacceptable, and is equivalent to harming our weapons.

Forgive me. We are in a completely new era. We will arrest those who seek to arrest us. We will shoot anyone who shoots at us. We will cut the hand that extends to (hurt) those young men. There is no need for this entire story. Come, let us talk and see who contradicts the law and who is assaulting public money. It is a shame that, today, the Lebanese Prime Minister (Walid Jumblaat) confesses that he is a thief and admits on TV that he has two notebooks. He admits to lying - the difference between lying and a liar is that lying becomes a second nature to a liar. He's a liar with 25 years of experience in his confession and a killer in his confession. Today, the person ruling the country, and it is required of leaders, religious leaders, and sects to follow his plan, is a liar, a thief, a murderer! He heads the government today, gives out orders, and lays out red lines...while the resistance and the fathers and sons of martyrs who, if not for them Lebanon would have become ‘Israeli', are to be sent to court?! Nobody will take anyone to court! This is not a government. It's a gang dominating people even if the whole world supported them, even if Bush rendered his support to it daily. This is a condemnation in their right, not ours!

The second title: The issue of the airport. Its subject is not General Wafik Shokeir though its title is General Wafik Shokeir. After the parliamentary elections we were massively pressured to dismiss General Wafik Shokeir in order to bring a new general I don't want to name. Many names were presented and we rejected them. There were problems over this issue. Why the insistence? I would like to say that General Shokeir doesn't belong to Amal movement or Hizbullah or to any other opposition party. He's a general in the national institution (the Army), and we all agree on its patriotism and its pioneering unifying role. We all agree on the army. (He is) Like all other patriotic officers that are the sons of this institution, they were raised to apply the law and not abide to (party) leaders.

The issue from the beginning is when this government was formed they wanted to put their hand on the airport not to steal because they already are stealing. Now in the airport there are several issues, entering and exiting, that concern them (the government), and even General Shokeir doesn't know about them. Many are the boxes and baggage that have entered and left the airport and God knows what is in them: weapons, money, white (drugs), green (money), black (weapons)....God knows. This is existent. Yet this is not the story. The issue is that it is required of the Beirut airport to become a base for the FBI, CIA, and ‘Israeli' Mossad. Quite honestly this is the issue. If not, where is the security disorder in the airport? Trips arrive and depart and so are people, and there is no problem at the airport or in its vicinity at all. Yes, the presence of a patriotic general that abides to the law whom they know very well through his patriotism is an obstacle in transforming Beirut's Martyr Rafiik Hariri airport into a spying base for the United States and the Mossad, Shabak, Shin Bet, etc. This is the issue. That's why it is required that General Wafik Shokeir should be fired meanwhile they weren't able to in the past. Even after we resigned from the government they attempted that, but they faced the obstacle of His Excellency President Emile Lahoud who would refuse to sign such decree.

Now this unconstitutional government which believes that it has the jurisdiction of the president has taken this step. What is intended is bringing a general loyal to one of those leaders who are employed by the CIA and FBI. This is the airport's story in a nutshell.
Quite frankly we cannot tolerate the presence of a CIA, FBI, or Mossad base in our neighborhood. People's blood, dignity, and safety are more precious and over any other consideration. Yet the logic of the government and gang exists. His Eminence Sheikh Abdul Amir Qabalan called the Deputy Prime Minister Fouad Saniora and told him that this issue can't be dealt with in this manner, and if General Shokeir was negligent in the issue of the cameras which is a ridiculously absurd obvious issue, let there be an investigation and send it to court...We will not defend negligent generals that have broken the law. And if he is not negligent, why do you want to fire him?

His Eminence Sheikh Qabalan and everyone that has stood by General Shokeir in this matter is not defending a Shiite general; he's defending a patriotic general. Since when General Shokeir is desecrated all patriotic generals in Lebanon will be desecrated. And every general will observe that his security institution and government are not protecting him, and that the ones that protect him are the political leaders. The last thing left in this country is the army, and if it crumples nothing will be left. These couple of days what has stopped a civil war from breaking out is a national willpower in the country and the presence of a military institution... and if the patriotic generals are desecrated the country is gone. We look at the issue at a deeper level than the airport and farther than the issue of General Shokeir. The issue is preserving what has been left of this country, the army with the hope that matters in this country will straighten up again. He (Saniora) promised him (Qabalan) and told the latter "Allah willing..." But he (Saniora) is but an employee. The true Premier (Jumblat) told them no, he had taken the decision to fire General Wafik Shokeir. Why didn't he (Jumblat) hold a press conference in Clemenseau, but went to Al Mukhtara and make the decision to fire (Shokeir) from there? Employees must follow their orders

They didn't investigate or prosecute or even give General Shokeir a chance to defend himself. And what is he charged with anyway? This is how gangs work: We are the government and are not a government within a government. The day of Mar Mokhayel incidents seven young men like primrose were killed, slaughtered. We did not take revenge on anyone or judge anyone. All we did was be bear the pains of our wounds and said that we wanted an investigation, a prosecution, and that the negligent be held responsible. Who is the government and who is the gang in this country? Who had the logic of a government and who has the logic of a gang in this country?...the ones who are killed , slaughtered, pleading for an investigation and prosecution or the ones who in absentia prosecute the chief of airport security after tens of years of military service as a result of a absurd ridiculous charge titled as a surveillance camera on a container in the presence of thousands of similar cameras in the area and in Lebanon? Who is the gang and who is the government? Therefore in this matter the decision that is issued by an unconstitutional government is unconstitutional... and General Shokeir will keep his post as chief of airport security and will bear his responsibilities in airport security. And any other offices that takes this post is an impersonator and must be aware that he is an impersonator and that he is previously adjudicated of coming to implement a decision to transform Rafik Hariri International Airport into a base for the CIA, FBI, and Mossad... whomever the officer may be... Shiite, Sunni, Durzi, Christian, or Muslim, they are all the same! Treason and treachery have no religion, have no sect!

The third and final title is the current crisis. They are the ones who pushed matters to this current crisis. We were being patient. We were killed, and killed, and killed...and we remained patient. We considered that we were killed in a homeland issue and that it is fine as long as there is a government, Judiciary, and a power struggle. But when they took these decisions they created a new crisis.

To us, we have entered a new stage. Here, I do not declare war. I declare (our) oppression and a decision to defend ourselves. I declare that after that dark gloomy night's decisions is different from before them. After today, we will not be killed in the streets anymore! No longer will we accept being fired at from anyone! We will not allow conspiracies against our weapons! We won't tolerate any subjection of our existence and legality anymore! ... Even if all the armies in the world came (to subject us)... This is our decision today in all clarity and transparency.

Whoever wants dialogue will get dialogue. Whoever wants a settlement will find the doors to settlement wide open. What is the way out of the crisis? Two phrases. First, annulling the unconstitutional decisions of Walid Jumblaat's unconstitutional government. Second, answering Chairman Nabih Berri's previous call for national dialogue. There is no other way out nor is there any (other) solution. There is a party that declared war on another party, and we are not the ones who started. A party declared war on another party and you tell me to come and solve the issue. This is how we solve the matter and we have no problems on our part.
I would also like to address the Arab and Muslim nations which everyone in Lebanon is addressing today. Yesterday we heard voices we didn't hear throughout the July war for 33 days, and didn't observe this warmth, these emotions and enthusiasm when ‘Israel' had forced the evacuation of over a million Lebanese, destroyed more than a hundred thousand homes, ruined the infrastructure and threatened all of Lebanon. I would like to address them all by saying: Had the struggle been over a partnership government or power, we would have settled with a political stance, demonstrating, and strikes. A thousand times I said we are not competing for power, the government, a ministry, or any position within the government. All what has been said to the Arab and Islamic world about a coup and government is worthless. The truth of what is happening now in Lebanon is that there is a pro-American subsidiary serving committed party that is implementing a scheme that America and ‘Israel' have failed to impose, which is the disarmament of the resistances arms. That party has provided commitments in this regard since 2005 and has failed to live up to the commitments.

Therefore I don't seek aid of assistance from anyone just like I did in the July war. All of Lebanon and the (southern) suburb was bombed, and I was in the suburb, and I said this then that we do not seek aid or assistance from anyone, and he who wants to assist was welcome, but I wasn't asking for anything. But today I do ask something. I ask for understanding and that the Arab and Islamic public opinion not be mislead, since they always threaten us upon the smallest issue: Look, if you stand up there may be a Sunni-Shiite affliction. They have always threatened us with this sectarian affliction.

Therefore, today I declare that we are no longer worried about this Shiite-Sunni affliction. This topic is over. This weapon cannot be used anymore. The battle today is not between Sunnis and Shiites or among some Sunnis and some Shiites. No. Today there is a noble national resistance project and an American project building up. There is no regard to whomever is on that (American) side, even if wears a hundred Amamas (Islamic sheikh head dress) or a hundred caps or a hundred costume of a Muslim religious man nor of Christian religious man or of a politician.

I am the most person that used to fear and worry (about sectarian violence) and they have always betted on that. When they took these decisions they were betting that Hizbullah wouldn't do anything or would merely issue a statement that would relieve its base (followers). Why? Because Hizbullah is very cautious of two points: One, sectarian violence which they always face us with. Here I would like to inform you that, to me, he who extends his hand to the resistance's arms, be he a Sunni, he is not deemed Sunni, and be he a Shiite, he is not deemed Shiite, and be he a Muslim, he is not deemed a Muslim, and be he a Christian, he is no way related to Jesus. Two, using arms on the homefront. We will not use our arms in the interior for a coup nor to change the government, or to impose a status-quo. Rather, the weapons will be used to protect the weapons from anyone.

You have crossed the red lines. We have no more red lines. And we are not afraid of Sunni-Shiite violence for two reasons. First, all the Arab and Islamic world know the nature of the conflict in the country. After the July war we were subjected to a libelous campaign sponsored by millions of dollars from the Arab and Islamic world in the form of media sources, satellite TV stations, authors, newspapers, and even some religious personalities that roamed the entire Arab world to say that Hizbullah is Iranian, is Syrian, is Shiite, is, is.....but no mention of anything related to ‘Israel'. In the past two years millions of dollars have been spent in order to disfigure our image in the Arab and Islamic world, but it has not been disfigured because Hizbullah's image is as bright and clear as the sun and cannot be disfigured by anyone. This is one thing.

The second thing: today, the Amamas and addresses of the Sunnis that have been employed most certainly know our relationship with them. Because they know our stance, faith, and belief that they, the Sunnis, -even if we disagree with them- are our brothers in religion, in the country, in the resistance, and in fate. And because there are among the gracious Sunni sect some deep-rooted patriotic leaderships, households, and religious and patriotic parties and movements. And because there are religious scholars that are faithful and sincere and can say the truth to all the Arab and Islamic world....(because of all this) there won't be Sunni-Shiite violence in Lebanon. We are past the subject now, and I hope nobody intimidates with it.
Today we are in this position. Our decision is clear. And this is our diagnosis of the new stage: The government of Mr. Walid Jumblaat, the government of Mr. David Welch, the government of Ms. Condaleeza Rice... in which there are employees from some sects. And corresponding to our diagnosis is our decision. There are two hands. One extended for dialogue on grounds of annulling the wrongful decisions and sitting at a table for dialogue inn answer to calls from Chairman Nabih Berri. In the other there is a weapon, and this weapon is not for assaulting anyone or to carry out a coup. In Hizbullah, it is our conviction that if all Lebanese, Arabs, Muslims, and international community joined and told Hizbullah that we are good guys and that our administration is a good one, that we don't steal public money, and said that they will hand over the government in Lebanon for us to rule the country...we would apologize and say that we are not capable of bearing the responsibility because the salvation of the country requires everyone.

We are not seeking authority nor are we planning to overthrow the government nor are we weak, frightened, or terrified. Our hopes for the future are very large. You (the unconstitutional government) are the ones whose dreams have begun to vanish. It is you who have fired at our dreams and not at us when you took those dark decisions on that dark gloomy night. We don't want to assault anyone, nor do we want to perform a coup or usurp the country. They talk of a coup. What coup? Had there been a coup you would have awoke to find yourselves cast in prison or in the sea. But we have never, for a day, resorted to this means. We have always said that there is a political crisis, a political struggle in the country. Its tools are political tools; the resolutions are political, and the means are political be it dialogue, early elections, consensus, poll...and never was a day when we talked of arms.

What is required to exit the crisis: We thank those who call and say they care for the country. The way out of the ongoing (political) congestion is by annulling the unconstitutional governments' decisions and sitting at the table for dialogue. Opposing will take us somewhere else. The game being played is a dangerous one. We care for the country and this is how we are devoted to it and how we can overcome the current ongoing crisis in Lebanon.

Review
'Voice of Hezbollah' attempts to bring the voice of Hassan Nasrallah to the page
By Jim Quilty, Daily Star staff, Friday, January 18, 2008

BEIRUT - Hizbullah is a contentious subject and the Party of God provokes a remarkably wide range of responses and interpretations, both within Lebanon and without. Nationalist and leftist apologists tend to stress the party's popularity and legitimacy as an integral part of Lebanon's social and political landscape. They predictably highlight the development and social-welfare services the party supplies to significant segments of Lebanon's Shiite community - contrasting this with the systemic neglect with which Lebanon's state has historically treated the marginal regions of the country - and contrast the party members' image of incorruptibility to the systemic graft of Lebanon's "allotment state." Those with a soft spot for social justice also appreciate Hizbullah's championing of the Palestinian cause.
Washington and its allies, on the other hand, vilify Hizbullah as a terrorist organization, frequently speaking of it in the same breath as "Islamo-fascists," like Al-Qaeda. They cite devastating suicide attacks against US and French interests in Lebanon during the worst days of Lebanon's Civil War (credit for which the party has denied) as well as its intransigent militancy against Israeli policies, indeed its very existence.
Washington's Lebanese allies express various anxieties vis-a-vis the party. Most common among politicians is that the party is a tool of Tehran and Damascus - though Lebanon's political class (including Hizbullah's present accusers) has habitually depended on friendly foreign powers to advance their own domestic interests.
Some distrust a party whose Islamist ideology is represented as the highest form of confessionalism, long the bete noire of the secular left. Others find strong echoes of fascism (or at least authoritarianism) in Hizbullah - whether in its ideological premises in the festering injustices afflicting Palestinians and Lebanon's Shiite population, the closed decision-making process of its leadership or its culture of militancy. They fear the party's anti-sectarian rhetoric would erase Lebanon's "confessional democracy" within an effectively Islamist state.
It's been difficult for Western audiences to form opinions independent of those of the news media, not least because Hizbullah's core leadership, unlike that of its counterparts presently running the Lebanese government, rarely if ever speaks publicly in English or French.
Intent on coming to the rescue are Nicholas Noe and Ellen Khouri, who have collaborated to produce "Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah." Noe, who includes among his credits a stint as a "news editor" at this very publication, is the ambitious young founder and editor in chief of the Beirut-based news translation service mideastwire.com. Khouri is a veteran translator, editor, human-rights consultant and managing director of the Lebanese publishing house Al-Kutba. Both provide introductory essays, as does another alumnus of this paper, Nicholas Blanford - who for years covered Hizbullah's resistance activities in Israel's erstwhile South Lebanon occupation zone (from 1978 to 2000).
The book's raison d'etre is a simple and laudable one. Noe and Khouri have fished up a collection of Nasrallah's interviews and speeches spanning from March 1986 to August 2006, translated them and offered them up as a bound primary source. In these 20 years, Nasrallah rose from a relatively obscure party spokesman, to Hizbullah secretary general (in the wake of Abbas Mussawi's assassination), to a figure of virtually unrivaled prestige in Lebanon and the region.
The book records his comments on a range of incidents including Israel's air assaults on Lebanon in 1993, 1996 and 2006; Israel's withdrawal from South Lebanon; the rise of Al-Qaeda; the events of September 11, 2001, and their repercussions in Iraq; the second intifada; United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 and the mounting pressure on the resistance to disarm in the wake of the February 2005 assassination of Lebanon's former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. It bundles these chapters into three sections - "Radicalism and Resistance, 1986-1999," "Repositioning, 2000-2004," and "February 14, 2005 and After."
Underlying this selection like a leitmotif is the question of Hizbullah's "Lebanon-ization." The premise is that under Mussawi and the early days of Nasrallah's leadership, the party was a creature of the 1979 Iranian Revolution that abjured Lebanese politics and bent its mind to fighting Israel. As the party became more institutionalized, it also grew more adaptable to Lebanese realities.
The existential question arising from this evolution is whether the accommodation was merely rhetorical or reflects more profound changes in the party's ideology and organization. In his introduction Blanford chooses to address this issue by invoking the term taqiyya, which in Jaafari jurisprudence allows believers to pretend to be something else. It's a regrettably orientalist decision - not because there is no taqiyya but because dissimulation (aka "lying") has been no stranger to political practice, regardless of what religion the politicians happen to be.
Readers will find no answer to this existential question here but they will find evidence of the political, or at least rhetorical, evolution of the party over these 20 years. Nasrallah's remarks in the 1980s systematically underline that Hizbullah has no relationship to the Lebanese political system. It has no wish, he says, to establish its own canton (in contrast to the decentralized sectarian model put forth by the Lebanese Forces), nor to compete for pieces of the confessional political pie.
In response to fears that Hizbullah would foist an Islamic state upon Lebanon's mixed bag of confessional communities, he reiterates some well-worn Koranic injunctions against forced conversions on one hand, and champions the rights of non-Muslims on the other. Khouri's translation has Nasrallah gone so far as to reject the legitimacy of Lebanon's national boundaries, saying all colonially drawn borders are illegitimate. It samples an anti-colonialist discourse that might have been lifted straight from a revolutionary Arabist tract of the 1950s and 1960s, recast in Islamic terms.
By 1992, two years after the end of the Civil War and the imposition of the Taif Accord, Nasrallah explains that the party rejects the Taif agreement because it takes the custom of political sectarianism and enshrines it at a constitutional level. Confessionalism is anathema to Hizbullah, he explains, because it contradicts the democratic principle of one man-one vote. He further reiterates the party's refusal to participate in any government whose object is to implement Taif.
Later, the resistance casts its work in increasingly Lebanese-patriotic terms. By 1996, Nasrallah's depiction of Hizbullah's agenda increasingly accentuates the correspondence between the party and the other political groupings in Lebanon's sectarian system. The party, at this point, also champions Taif. In his speech on March 8, 2005, to some 800,000-plus supporters, Nasrallah remarks that the Syrian Army's withdrawal from Lebanon should be pursued as the implementation of Taif, rather than compliance to Resolution 1559.
In his introduction, Noe acknowledges that this book is only a primer that focuses almost exclusively on the party's role in conducting and/or fomenting militancy against the state of Israel. Indeed, the book raises more methodological questions than it answers. By using Nasrallah's interviews and speeches as equally valuable barometers of change in the party's rhetorical-political line, the editors never address the question of whether the secretary general even writes his own speeches.
Though the book does a great service to a readership with an interest in the contemporary Middle East but without the Arabic-language skills to grasp primary sources on their own, it can only scratch the surface in terms of conveying Nasrallah's appeal. The nature of translation itself ensures these statements represent only a pale shadow of Nasrallah's rhetorical profile on the Lebanese and Arab landscape.
His remarks may be faithfully reproduced in English, but it is fiendishly difficult for the translator to capture the impact of Nasrallah's Arabic fluency upon his intended audience. This is the difficult terrain of charisma, which has defied satisfying methodological treatment for ages, even for those fluent in the cultural cues in which it's embedded.
As is inevitable in a book like this, a great deal of context is missing. Noe and Khouri preface each statement with introductory remarks to set the scene and highlight changes of rhetoric, and footnotes point out when Nasrallah's remarks stray from the historical record, sometimes suggesting countervailing interpretations.
Missing from the equation, at least for anyone wanting to understand Nasrallah's reception, are the quips, jibes and broadsides - comic, self-serving, bizarre - of Nasrallah's counterparts in the political class. This is significant because his style has endeared him to his followers (and has earned him the grudging respect of his rivals) because he has tended to say what he does and do what he says. It's a reputation unmatched by all except the one Lebanese politician of Nasrallah's stature, the late Rafik Hariri.
A single anecdote may convey some sense of the complexity of Nasrallah's reception in Lebanon. Part and parcel of his popular appeal is his sense of humor, completely ignored here. Some time after the summer 2006 war, a young, non-Shiite woman had one of Nasrallah's more amusing speeches recorded on her mobile phone. She took some delight in sharing his humor with her pals.
Recorded on the same mobile phone was a clandestine video shot of a couple engaged in a tryst, circulated because the young woman bore an uncanny resemblance to a well known Lebanese pop star.
"Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah" is published by Verso and available at Virgin Megastores throughout the Middle East

La concurrence à distance entre deux logiques d’action jihadistes différentes pour la captation des cœurs et des esprits de l’Umma 1
Par Rayan Haddad, Cultures & Conflits n°66 (été 2007), pp. 157-177
Cet article a pour objet de montrer, à travers notamment un examen transversal des crises du 11 septembre, de l’Afghanistan, d’Irak, de Palestine et du Liban, que l’on peut relever dans certains cas l’existence d’une « concurrence idéologique » entre le Hezbollah et Al Qaïda s’agissant de la captation des cœurs et des esprits d’une « audience panislamique globale ». Cette rivalité tournant autour de l’identité du « meilleur jihadisme » en présence sur la « scène islamique mondiale » (étant entendu qu’il ne s’agit pas du même jihad dans les deux cas) conduit surtout à un déploiement de « stratégies de distinction » entre les deux parties…

Une analyse relationnelle axée sur les logiques d’action concurrentes d’Al Qaïda 2 et du Hezbollah peut de prime abord surprendre le lecteur méconnaissant la scène moyen-orientale. Les deux parties, malgré leurs distinctions identitaires (et pas n’importe lesquelles puisque la division « sunnite / chiite » est un peu partout présentée comme la « clef de voûte analytique » d’un Orient finalement bien compliqué…), ne relèvent-elles pas finalement d’un même phénomène d’islamisme radical décrié par un grand nombre de médias contemporains ? L’approche peut de même provoquer un froncement de sourcils chez ceux qui connaissent mieux la géopolitique régionale. Malgré la similitude parfois de leur mode de violence opérationnel (« kamikaze »), la mouvance salafiste jihadiste n’est-elle pas la manifestation d’une contestation fanatique et déterritorialisée de l’ordre mondial, alors que le « parti de Dieu » s’inscrit dans l’optique de la libération (« légitime ») d’un territoire national ? Comment dès lors parler de concurrence ? Les deux parties n’ont pas les mêmes référents idéologiques (khomeynisme / salafisme), pas la même définition de leur champ d’action ni – par conséquent – la même hiérarchisation (effective et non rhétorique) de l’ennemi (Israël dans un cas, les Etats-Unis et l’Occident dans l’autre), pas les mêmes valeurs jihadistes (illégitimité / légitimité de prendre pour cible des civils occidentaux), pas la même organisation structurelle (fortement centralisée / décentralisée), et ne s’adresseraient pas a priori à un même public islamiste (localiste ou régionaliste d’une part, transnational de l’autre). En réalité, bien qu’elle soit virtuelle et à distance, l’objet de cet article est de montrer qu’il y a bel et bien dans certains cas concurrence idéologique entre le Hezbollah et Al Qaïda au niveau de la captation des cœurs et des esprits d’une audience panislamique mondiale, conduisant (peut-être parfois) à une logique de mimétisme, mais surtout à des stratégies de distinction entre les deux parties. Cette concurrence a pour toile de fond un contexte moyen-oriental où les sentiments anti-impérialistes battent son plein, et où l’on observe un processus de réactivation d’identités religieuses transfrontalières questionnant la légitimité de l’ordre régional. Nous proposons de présenter tout d’abord les contextes respectifs d’émergence des contestations khomeynistes et salafistes jihadistes.
Mutations du fondamentalisme islamique
Le revivalisme islamique a pris un essor considérable au début des années 1970 grâce à la conjonction de deux facteurs : la défaite des régimes panarabes « laïcisants » dans la guerre des Six Jours (1967) et l’augmentation des revenus pétroliers sur fond de guerre israélo-arabe en 1973. C’est à cette période que l’Arabie Saoudite commence à prendre un avantage idéologique déterminant sur l’influence massive qu’avaient eue auparavant les mouvements révolutionnaires « socialisants » sur les opinions publiques arabes ; des sommes considérables sont consacrées à la « résurgence de l’islam » dans tous les domaines de la vie politique, économique et sociale 3.
« Les Saoudiens se sont rendus compte que la stabilité de leur règne sur la péninsule du pétrole […] requiert deux éléments fondamentaux : la consolidation de la légitimité religieuse sur laquelle est basé leur règne […], et le soutien actif de la plus grande puissance occidentale, les Etats-Unis 4 ».
Seulement, la révolution iranienne de 1979 contribue à un changement radical d’atmosphère idéologique que l’intégrisme islamique « conservateur » avait entamé une décennie auparavant. La libération de la Palestine, la lutte contre le « faux panislamisme » des régimes « clients des Etats-Unis » et l’exportation de la Révolution deviennent les thèmes majeurs de la politique iranienne 5. Désormais, deux grands types d’idéologie islamique sont en concurrence dans le monde. En participant activement au financement du jihad afghan contre l’URSS, Riyad réussit à contenir et concurrencer le zèle islamiste iranien dans les milieux sunnites et à confirmer, par conjonction d’intérêts, son alliance avec Washington 6. Mais la guerre du Golfe allait fragiliser la crédibilité islamique de la monarchie. Obligée d’assurer sa sécurité par un appel à l’aide occidentale, elle va permettre la présence de centaines de milliers de soldats américains sur la terre des lieux saints de l’islam 7. Pour la première fois allait apparaître au sein même de l’establishment religieux wahhabite, un salafisme de plus en plus opposé à la politique officielle légitimant la présence de « croisés » sur son sol sacré. A cette opposition « salafiste intellectuelle » de l’intérieur allait s’ajouter le sentiment de trahison de la mouvance salafiste jihadiste transnationale.
« C’était là le plus grand choc de sa vie [Ben Laden], parce qu’il s’agissait – selon lui – de la première fois depuis l’âge d’or de la Prophétie (soit depuis près de quinze siècles) que les impies imposaient leur hégémonie militaire sur la péninsule arabique. Il fut aussi choqué parce que les forces américaines ne pénétraient pas à la suite d’une occupation ou à l’insu du plein gré des dirigeants, mais à leur demande expresse 8 ».
Dès lors, et sans relater ses péripéties (qui l’amèneront de l’Afghanistan au Soudan en 1992, puis à faire la trajectoire inverse en 1996 9), Ben Laden diffusera en 1996 une Déclaration de jihad contre « l’occupation américaine de la terre des lieux saints ». La création en 1998 du « Front islamique mondial pour la guerre sainte contre les juifs et les croisés » s’inscrit dans cette continuité. Désormais, et par l’entremise d’une fatwa, « chaque musulman qui en est capable a le devoir personnel de tuer les Américains et leurs alliés, civils et militaires, en tout pays où cela est possible 10 ». Contrairement à la vision de Raymond Williams : « Pensez à l’échelle mondiale, agissez au niveau local », on pourrait dire que Ben Laden et son entourage pensent désormais localement et agissent globalement 11. C’est dans ce cadre que s’inscrivent les attentats contre les ambassades américaines en Tanzanie et au Kenya le 7 août 1998, contre l’USS Cole en octobre 2000, avant le choc du 11 septembre. Jusque-là, on ne voit pas encore quel rapport de concurrence peut exister entre Al Qaïda et le Hezbollah, bien que l’on commence à entrevoir qu’un tel état ne serait pas incohérent de la part de parties opposées (chacune à leur façon) à l’» ordre américain » au Moyen-Orient et représentant les fils spirituels (respectivement « illégitimes » et « légitimes ») du salafisme officiel et de la prédication khomeyniste.
Contestation systémique convergente, normes et logiques d’action divergentes
« L’Amérique est le chef des criminels impliqués dans le crime de la création de l’Etat d’Israël qui reste récurrent depuis 50 ans. […] Votre gouvernement encercle les enfants d’Irak et les massacre horriblement. Il soutient totalement les régimes corrompus dans nos pays. Peuple américain, sache que ton gouvernement te mène à une nouvelle guerre perdue d’avance. Rappelle-toi qu’il a subi la défaite au Vietnam, qu’il a déguerpi apeuré du Liban, qu’il s’est enfui de Somalie et qu’il a été frappé à Aden ». Ayman al Zawahiri, extraits de son intervention diffusée par Al Jazira, le 7 octobre 2001
« Ces jours-ci, les chars israéliens pénètrent partout pour répandre la désolation en Palestine, à Jénine, Ramallah, Rafah, Bayt Jala […] sans que l’on entende personne élever la voix ou agir. […] Quand des centaines de milliers de petits et grands sont tués […] au Japon, cela ne constitue pas un crime à leurs yeux, mais juste une affaire qui peut faire l’objet d’un débat. Ce qui se passe en Irak est aussi une affaire qui peut être débattue. Mais quand des dizaines parmi eux sont tués à Nairobi et Dar al Salam, l’Afghanistan et l’Irak ont été bombardés et toute la fausseté du monde s’est tenue aux côtés de […] l’Amérique et ceux qui la soutiennent ». Oussama Ben Laden, Al Jazira, le 7 octobre 2001
En choisissant de faire passer leur premier message après le 11 septembre sur Al Jazira le jour du début de l’offensive américaine en Afghanistan, les dirigeants d’Al Qaïda faisaient preuve d’une grande maîtrise de l’instrument médiatique. Vis-à-vis de l’audience qu’ils cherchent à capter, ils peuvent en effet se placer plus aisément dans une posture « victimaire » et faire appel à l’Umma 12 pour s’engager dans un jihad globalisé contre « les actes d’agression des croisés ». Comme le souligne Gilles Kepel, « l’attaque spectaculaire de cibles américaines […] est censée résoudre le problème majeur qui a hypothéqué le succès des islamistes [d’Al Qaïda] jusqu’alors : l’absence d’adhésion populaire à leur projet 13 ». Pour tenter de s’attirer la bienveillance du « public islamique », rien ne vaut aussi de soulever les questions de Palestine et d’Irak. Mais les leaders d’Al Qaïda ont été plus loin que cela ; ils ont semblé « universaliser » leur procès anti-américain en évoquant Hiroshima et Nagazaki (Ben Laden), et le Vietnam (Zawahiri). La première évocation s’inscrit dans le cadre d’une condamnation éthique, la seconde dans le cadre d’un rappel des défaites subies par l’Amérique. Sur ce plan, Zawahiri n’hésite pas à mentionner le grand revers subi par les Etats-Unis au Liban dans les années 1980, alors que celui-ci est survenu par le biais du Hezbollah chiite 14. Il ne sera pas le seul à se référer à cet épisode. A la suite du 11 septembre, le retrait des forces multinationales du Liban en 1984 sera rétrospectivement considéré par de grands responsables américains comme un faux pas stratégique majeur sur le plan de la « lutte anti-terroriste ».
« Malgré notre supériorité militaire, nous étions incapables de contrer la ferveur religieuse de cette faction soutenue par l’Iran et la Syrie. […] Reagan ordonna aux forces américaines d’évacuer le Liban. Dans tout le Moyen-Orient, on releva la facilité avec laquelle on pouvait chasser une superpuissance […]. Des années plus tard, Oussama Ben Laden devait citer parmi les succès du terrorisme le fait d’avoir chassé les Américains de Beyrouth 15 ».
Richard Clarke (ancien responsable de la coordination antiterroriste au Conseil national de sécurité américain) ne se trompe pas ; Ben Laden avait eu l’occasion – avant même Zawahiri – de relever la « lâcheté américaine » au Liban :
« Il y a quelques jours, les agences de presse ont transmis une déclaration du ministre de la Défense américain [William Cohen], croisé et occupant, dans lequel il disait qu’il n’avait retenu qu’une leçon des explosions de Riyad et d’al-Khobar : ne pas reculer devant les lâches terroristes. Eh bien, nous disons à ce ministre […] où était cette prétendue bravoure, à Beyrouth, après l’attentat de 1403 [1983] qui a fait de vos 241 Marines des paillettes éparpillées et des membres déchiquetés, et où est cette prétendue bravoure à Aden dont vous êtes partis précipitamment, 24 heures après les deux attentats ? 16 »
Ainsi, Zawahiri mentionne le Liban en tant que premier cas arabe et « islamique » ayant provoqué une déroute américaine, alors que Ben Laden fait mention, dans une même lignée, des attentats à la voiture piégée survenus contre des représentations officielles ou militaires américaines à Riyad en 1995, à Khobar en 1996 (indépendamment du fait de savoir si Al Qaïda était derrière ces attentats ou non 17), à Aden en 1992 18, et tout d’abord à Beyrouth. Les méthodes du Hezbollah dans les années 1980 19 auraient-elles constitué une « source d’inspiration » pour les leaders d’Al Qaïda, non seulement au niveau des moyens utilisés, mais aussi au niveau de l’effectivité présumée des attentats ? En réalité, aucun élément ne permet de prouver cette hypothèse. Ce n’est donc pas dans une quelconque « filiation opérationnelle » que nous trouverons des points de convergence sectoriels entre Al Qaïda et le Hezbollah, mais dans leur contestation de l’» ordre américain » au Moyen-Orient, étant entendu que les prémisses et la nature jihadiste de cette contestation constituent un point de divergence fondamental entre les deux parties. Le discours anti-américain de la mouvance n’est en effet pas le même que celui adopté par l’Iran et le Hezbollah. En dépit des slogans de « Mort à l’Amérique » véhiculés par les entrepreneurs de l’idéologie khomeyniste, ceux-ci prennent soin de souligner que s’ils s’opposent aux politiques officielles américaines, ils n’ont « rien contre le peuple américain » (ou d’autres peuples occidentaux) :
« Pour nous, la bataille principale est la Palestine […]. Notre problème n’est pas avec le peuple américain. […] Notre mission envers les peuples occidentaux doit être de leur faire parvenir convenablement nos revendications et l’image de nos justes causes. […] On ne peut pas porter un jugement global sur l’ensemble des gens en Occident. Le dialogue est absolument nécessaire 20 ».
En ce sens, il convient de relever qu’il existe une différence de nature entre les attentats « kamikazes » libanais ou palestiniens et ceux du 11 septembre au niveau de la définition de l’ennemi et de la visée contextuelle du combat 21. Ainsi, même si « le Hezbollah et la prédication khomeyniste ont les moyens d’une structuration en réseau à l’étranger 22 », voire d’une implication dans une violence opérationnelle bien au-delà des frontières libanaises 23, il reste que ce mode d’action (si avéré) constitue pour la mouvance khomeyniste, contrairement à Al Qaïda, un « cas exceptionnel » à ses règles de combat localistes 24. Mais comment le Hezbollah a-t-il réagi aux attentats du 11 septembre ?
L’Amérique sous le choc, le Hezbollah « défié »
Le retrait israélien inconditionnel du Liban-Sud en 2000 fut considéré dans le monde arabe comme le premier succès militaire remporté contre Tsahal. Le Hezbollah pouvait alors asseoir le large capital de sympathie qu’il avait acquis dans cette aire (majoritairement sunnite) tout au long de ses années de combat contre Israël. La rhétorique du « parti de Dieu » sur l’efficacité des « opérations-martyre » et du harcèlement militaire – propagée par sa télévision satellitaire Al Manar – gagnait en crédibilité dans la région 25. La « preuve » était en effet apportée que la société israélienne « occidentalisée » ne pouvait plus consentir à une logique de sacrifice afin de maintenir ses conquêtes ; que le retrait était un signe de faiblesse dont il fallait tirer profit ; qu’une décennie de négociations israélo-palestiniennes n’avait pas abouti à la restitution des territoires occupés alors qu’une décennie de résistance au Liban l’avait fait. L’effectivité de cette rhétorique ne saurait être sous-estimée en tant que facteur d’incitation au déclenchement le 28 septembre 2000 de l’Intifada d’al Aqsa. Fort de cette victoire, le Hezbollah verra son impact politique consolidé sur la scène interne vu le grand contrôle social et sécuritaire qu’il exercera désormais de facto au Sud. Ce contrôle sera renforcé par la décision de l’Etat libanais (en fait de son tuteur syrien) de refuser l’application de l’Accord d’armistice libano-israélien de 1949, le déploiement de son armée au Sud et le désarmement du Hezbollah tant qu’une solution ne sera pas trouvée au problème des réfugiés palestiniens au Liban, et – trouvaille stratégique damascène – tant qu’Israël maintiendra son occupation des hameaux de Chebaa 26. Comme le combat jihadiste contre Israël constitue un objectif majeur du Hezbollah, comme, selon les termes de Sayyed Nawaf al Moussawi 27, « il n’est pas possible de parler du désengagement d’une partie arabe du combat avant la fin du conflit israélo-arabe », et comme la Syrie est le garant qui détient principalement les clefs de ce combat, une alliance du parti avec la Syrie est incontournable. Suivant cette équation, le Sud reste donc ouvert aux vents de confrontation régionale… C’est dans ce contexte de consécration du jihadisme hezbollahi que surviennent les attentats du 11 septembre. De tous les partis au Liban, c’est le Hezbollah qui a la stratégie la plus élaborée quant au traitement des événements. Le fait qu’il représente le cas local le plus susceptible d’être dans la ligne de mire américaine (dans le cadre de la « lutte anti-terroriste ») n’est pas étranger à cela. Son communiqué initial comprend un degré minimal de condamnation et invite surtout à prendre garde à d’éventuelles instrumentalisations politiques des attentats de la part de Washington 28. En réalité, ceux-ci constituent un défi majeur pour le Hezbollah sur un double plan. D’un côté, alors que son « image de marque » s’est bâtie autour des « opérations-martyre » (au point de susciter un processus émulatif dans les territoires palestiniens 29), le contexte créé par le 11 septembre risquait de condamner définitivement sur la scène internationale la logique sacrificielle 30 motivant ces opérations et de favoriser la (re)labellisation du parti en tant qu’» organisation terroriste ». D’autre part :
« Alors qu’il se considérait comme l’avant-garde jihadiste dans le monde arabe et islamique au niveau de la lutte contre Israël et les politiques américaines, il se rendait compte que cette grande attaque contre les Etats-Unis mettait en valeur Ben Laden et rendait son image subitement marginale dans cette lutte. En plus, quelles que soient critiques les positions sunnites vis-à-vis de Ben Laden, il peut représenter dans ces milieux une sorte de symbole et cela préoccupe le Hezbollah parce qu’il est soucieux de sauvegarder son capital de sympathie acquis sur la scène sunnite globale après la libération du Sud 31 ».
Ainsi, même si la Schadenfreude 32 existant dans certains milieux sunnites – au Liban et ailleurs – constituait moins une adhésion au programme de Ben Laden qu’une expression d’hostilité envers l’Amérique (liée à ses positions emplies de partialité dans le conflit israélo-palestinien), le Hezbollah se devait de réagir pour éviter, outre les risques d’amalgame sur la scène mondiale entre « terrorisme » et « résistance », ceux de marginalisation (au niveau de son combat jihadiste). Il le fera en menant une offensive discursive par le biais de son secrétaire général, « véritable maître en mass-communication 33 » :
« Il existe une grande différence entre la résistance et le terrorisme. Les terroristes n’ont pas de sentiments humains. Ce sont des assassins et des criminels politiques. Ils tuent pour tuer et non pour une cause noble […] alors que la résistance qui combat pour les déshérités est emplie d’amour et déborde de compassion. Cherchez dans les cœurs de Sharon, Pérès, Barak, Bush père et fils et vous n’y trouverez pas de miséricorde mais vous les trouverez emplis d’égoïsme et de corruption 34 ».
Lorsque les distinctions entre « terroristes » et « résistants » sont dressées, à aucun moment Ben Laden n’est mentionné, contrairement à plusieurs dirigeants israéliens et américains, ce qui ne peut manquer de séduire le public islamiste visé 35. Lorsque Sayyed Nasrallah affirme en outre dans le contexte de la guerre en Afghanistan que les Etats-Unis « font la guerre à tous les musulmans qui refusent de se soumettre et de s’agenouiller devant eux 36 », on ne peut manquer de voir que cette catégorie – large il est vrai – inclut Ben Laden et Al Qaïda, et peut constituer un clin d’œil aux milieux sunnites qui ressentent une empathie envers eux sans pour autant souscrire à leur idéologie salafiste jihadiste. Le Hezbollah prendra donc position contre la guerre menée par les Etats-Unis, mettant de côté l’hostilité ressentie envers les Talibans en milieu chiite. Outre la perception d’un danger militaire américain aux frontières du « parrain » iranien et le souhait objectif de voir les Etats-Unis s’enliser dans un bourbier, et même si « la nouvelle donne régionale n’était pas sans bénéfices pour Téhéran 37 », le parti était soucieux de sauvegarder son capital de sympathie auprès des milieux sunnites solidaires de la « cause afghane ». La posture du Hezbollah n’était néanmoins pas simple puisqu’il était aussi soucieux de marginaliser dans ses médias la rhétorique de Ben Laden. On pourrait relever qu’Al Manar n’a pas diffusé les interventions du 7 octobre 2001 des leaders d’Al Qaïda 38. Le parti semblait conscient des dangers à long terme du discours salafiste jihadiste (non dénué de takfirisme). La couverture exclusive de la guerre par Al Jazira n’était donc pas sans l’indisposer, d’autant plus qu’elle était loin de laisser indifférente une certaine audience arabophone 39. Il reste que les stratégies de démarcation vis-à-vis d’Al Qaïda se feront de manière très subtile à partir de la fin décembre 2001, c’est-à-dire après la défaite apparente des Talibans contre les Etats-Unis. C’est le moment que choisit le parti pour réaffirmer la centralité pour l’Umma de la question palestinienne, tout en faisant allusion aux orientations stratégiques « erronées » prises par la mouvance :
« Ô Umma, gouvernants et peuples… Venez donc nous concentrer sur notre combat et notre bataille dans le bon endroit, au bon moment et avec la juste responsabilité. Sortons des batailles, des champs et des conjonctures erronés. Soyons responsables et répondons à l’appel de ce peuple injustement frappé et offrant des sacrifices en Palestine 40 ».
Le point nodal palestinien ou la lutte entre la fonctionnalité régionale du Hezbollah et la stratégie d’adjonction d’Al Qaïda
Nul besoin de s’étendre ici sur la valeur que revêt la Palestine dans l’imaginaire du Hezbollah. Ayant combattu Tsahal pour une majeure partie de son histoire, le parti est bien placé pour s’identifier au combat des forces islamistes palestiniennes contre l’occupation. Mais pour lui, la Palestine ne relève pas seulement du domaine de l’affektuel weberien. Alors que ses « coreligionnaires » ont longtemps dû composer avec – voire se révolter contre – le statut périphérique de la Békaa et du Sud au sein de l’Etat libanais, le Hezbollah réussira à doter ce territoire d’une valeur stratégique majeure sur le plan moyen-oriental (prenant en cela une revanche objective contre l’Etat) du fait de la jonction accomplie dès le début des années 1980 entre la charge émotionnelle que ressent envers la Palestine toute mouvance islamique du Maroc à l’Indonésie et la politique de puissance régionale iranienne (à travers notamment le concept de wilâyat al faqîh) 41. Le soutien à la « libération de la Palestine » constitue en effet une source majeure de légitimité politique dans le monde islamique (surtout que la « lutte » que cette stratégie implique peut aisément être opposée à la « lâcheté » de nombreuses capitales arabes « tournant autour de l’orbite américain »). L’apport du Hezbollah est d’autant plus précieux à cet égard pour la République islamique qu’il a, contrairement à elle, la capacité de s’exprimer sans laisser une impression d’» intrusion » dans l’espace de sens arabe. A partir de là, la « récupération » (partielle du moins, nous le verrons) des leaders d’Al Qaïda de la question palestinienne ne peut qu’indisposer le Hezbollah et l’Iran, et il ne sera guère étonnant dès lors de voir le « parti de Dieu » entreprendre une offensive discursive axée sur la défense authentique de cette cause, ni de constater qu’il cherchera à discréditer (implicitement bien entendu pour ne pas heurter certaines sensibilités sunnites) la mouvance en pointant sur son « égarement stratégique » et son implication dans des « batailles erronées » éloignées du point nodal de l’Umma 42. Mais quelles sont les motivations ayant poussé Ben Laden et Zawahiri à investir cette cause et à la placer au cœur de leur débat, alors qu’ils n’étaient pas connus pour accorder une telle place à la Palestine ? Ce questionnement nous amène à examiner de manière plus approfondie les orientations stratégiques de la nébuleuse. Olivier Roy souligne qu’elle ne propose que « la vengeance à la frustration », et n’adopte aucune stratégie si ce n’est la tentative de provoquer « un fossé insurmontable entre l’Occident et le monde islamique », et de « conscientiser le “peuple” musulman par l’exemple des martyrs et l’effet des attentats qui frappent au cœur de la Babylone moderne » 43.
« Il [Ben Laden] n’a pas de stratégie ni d’objectifs politiques : rien n’était prévu pour le lendemain du 11 septembre. Contrairement aux islamistes “classiques” dont la violence, même sous la forme terroriste, vise un but stratégique et national […] et peut donc être “négociée”, les nouveaux radicaux ne se soucient ni de programme ni de résultat concret. Ils meurent pour la signification du geste mais pas pour son résultat, ils sont dans la réalisation de soi et donc dans une dimension mystique, mais pas dans l’ordre politique. Il n’y a donc rien à négocier 44 ».
Nous ne sommes pas d’accord avec l’idée que Ben Laden « n’a pas de stratégie ni d’objectifs politiques » ou qu’il ne se soucie pas de « résultat concret ». L’absence de clairvoyance stratégique ne signifie pas qu’il n’y a pas de pensée stratégique. Radicalement convaincus que les discours – voire les attentats jihadistes précédents – adressés à « l’Occident » n’ont pas eu d’effets déterminants, l’objectif des dirigeants de la mouvance était de répondre par la vengeance à l’» aveuglement » américain, mais aussi provoquer un électrochoc destiné à entraîner un questionnement quant aux raisons de cette expression de haine identitaire, et dissuader l’Amérique de continuer à exercer ses politiques jugées criminelles envers l’Umma. Tout cela relève (en plus d’une dimension eschatologique) d’une visée éminemment politique. Ici, Al Qaïda ne cherche effectivement pas à négocier mais à renverser le « rapport d’humiliation » existant avec l’Amérique et prétendre lui opposer, à elle et ses « suppôts », directement ou indirectement 45, une équation d’» équilibre de terreur » dans la logique de la loi du Talion 46. On ne saurait occulter non plus un objectif majeur de la mouvance : le jihad contre l’» occupation de la terre des lieux saints » perçue comme « la plus grande de toutes les agressions 47 ». Dans ce cadre, Ben Laden et Zawahiri semblent avoir été conscients des limites de la capacité de ralliement de la seule cause de « libération de la péninsule » auprès des audiences islamiques. Ils auraient été alors conscients de la nécessité d’adjoindre à celle-ci, celles notamment de Palestine et d’Irak, plus « parlantes » à l’opinion ciblée 48. Ici, nous ne sommes pas en présence d’une pure instrumentalisation (ces questions sont aussi importantes pour les hérauts d’Al Qaïda), mais d’une stratégie d’emphase (qui occulte l’ordre de préférence normative pour une meilleure efficience de propagande). L’opportunisme de cette stratégie d’adjonction peut être déduit du passé activiste de la mouvance en Afghanistan. En effet, quoiqu’ils puissent en dire à ce sujet, Ben Laden et ses compagnons ne semblaient pas choqués outre mesure des « 70 ans d’humiliation subis par l’Umma 49 » (notamment en Palestine) lorsqu’ils étaient objectivement alliés aux Américains dans le combat anti-soviétique, avant l’installation des premiers GI’s dans la péninsule arabique. L’opportunisme de cette stratégie peut aussi être révélé par le discours de Ben Laden du 7 octobre : il y accorde une grande importance à la question palestinienne en évoquant notamment les souffrances de quatre villes cisjordaniennes. Son mot de fin semble même placer la sécurité de la Palestine au cœur du nouvel « équilibre de la terreur » imposé aux Etats-Unis, mais la question centrale (pour lui) de la péninsule arabique enveloppe notablement sa péroraison :
« Tout musulman doit se soulever à l’appel de sa religion, et les vents de la foi et du changement se soulèvent pour mettre fin à l’injustice et à la fausseté religieuse dans la péninsule de Mohammad, paix sur lui. Quant à l’Amérique, je lui adresse à elle et son peuple des mots succincts : je jure par Dieu tout puissant que l’Amérique et ceux qui y vivent ne pourront jouir de sécurité tant que celle-ci ne sera pas effectivement une réalité en Palestine, et tant que les armées impies ne se retireront pas de la terre de Mohammad, paix sur lui ».
Mais cet opportunisme sera le mieux manifesté lorsque Zawahiri, après avoir martelé (dans son ouvrage Chevaliers sous la bannière du Prophète) la nécessité pour Al Qaïda de « se rapprocher des masses » et de « tenter de leur faire comprendre sa cause dans un style qui rende la vérité accessible à tous ceux qui veulent la connaître », constate (bien après l’Iran et le Hezbollah il faut dire) que « le slogan que l’Umma a bien compris et auquel elle adhère, depuis cinquante ans, est l’appel au jihad contre Israël » 50. Il sera manifesté enfin par défaut à partir de 2003 où l’on verra la Palestine (inaccessible) cesser d’occuper conjoncturellement le devant de la scène rhétorique de Ben Laden et ses acolytes (les faisant éviter ainsi un aveu d’impuissance) au profit de l’Irak (aux frontières bien plus perméables), nouveau théâtre de prédilection jihadiste contre « les Infidèles » 51.
Zarkawi contre les chiites d’Irak et du Hezbollah
Si Al Qaïda a pu à ce point délaisser une approche discursive axée sur la Palestine, c’est que Washington et Londres lui ont bien donné une occasion de le faire. Par le biais de leur invasion de l’Irak, la mouvance avait en effet une potentialité d’insertion jihadiste majeure dans ce pays. En fait, « les Américains n’ont pas pu saisir, malgré les signaux qui étaient déjà là, qu’Al-Qaida pourrait utiliser l’Irak comme un terrain de combat 52 ». Profitant d’un « choc psychologique de dépossession » ambiant en milieu arabo-sunnite 53, le salafiste jihadiste jordanien Abou Mous’ab al Zarkawi réussit à rallier divers islamistes radicaux, arabes et irakiens, candidats au jihad contre l’Amérique. Si leur nombre est minoritaire par rapport aux autres agents de l’» insurrection sunnite 54 », leur impact se fait surtout sentir au niveau de leur combat idéologique contre « les chiites ». Dans le « Message à l’Umma » qui lui est attribué, Zarkawi les accuse d’être – propos d’Ibn Taymiya à l’appui 55 – les suppôts intemporels des ennemis de l’Umma. Plus récemment, l’Amérique a bien compris que ces « firaq bâtiniya » (parties qui cachent leur jeu) et « râfida » (hérétiques) constituent « un cheval de Troie par lequel les fils de l’islam peuvent être pris à revers ». Mis à part leur « mainmise » sur les postes sensibles (police, armée…) en Irak, « ils » sont surtout accusés de projeter l’instauration d’un « Etat hérétique qui s’étend de l’Iran en passant par l’Irak, la Syrie [qualifiée de bâtiniya en allusion à son « régime alaouite »], le Liban hezbollahi, et les monarchies du Golfe en carton dont le territoire est parsemé de repères hérétiques 56 ». Ainsi, le Hezbollah – qui constitue l’une des parties chiites qui s’est le plus opposée à l’invasion américaine et qui a même soutenu la voie de la « résistance armée » dans l’Irak d’après-guerre 57 – se retrouve sous le feu des diatribes de Zarkawi. Les chiites semblent ainsi exécrés pour ce qu’ils sont, bien plus que pour ce qu’ils font. Pour autant, l’attentat à la voiture piégée du 29 août 2003 devant le mausolée de l’imam Ali à Najaf (causant la mort de l’ayatollah Mohammad Baqer al Hakim 58 et de plus de quatre-vingt pèlerins) s’inscrit dans une optique éminemment politique : faire payer au « chiisme irakien » ses accointances supposées ou réelles avec les Etats-Unis et l’Iran, et provoquer la fitna (grande discorde), seule jugée capable d’aboutir au « sursaut des sunnites » face à leurs ennemis. C’est dans cet esprit qu’aura lieu aussi, à l’occasion de la commémoration d’Ashura 59 le 2 mars 2004, une série d’attentats-suicides faisant plus de 180 morts et 500 blessés à Karbala et Bagdad. Les attentats zarkawistes 60 ne sont pas sans provoquer un malaise sécuritaire en milieu chiite glocal. Au Liban, il nous sera révélé « en coulisse » par la phrase laconique suivante : « Le phénomène des attentats-suicides contre les chiites en Irak ne tranquillise personne. Qui sait si demain certains ne viendraient pas se faire exploser au Liban ? 61 »
Ces craintes ne sont pas irréalistes lorsque l’on sait que Zarkawi jouit d’une grande popularité au sein du groupe salafiste palestinien Usbat al Ansar situé dans le camp de Aïn al Heloué à Saïda, à quelques kilomètres de la banlieue sud de Beyrouth 62. Elles ne sont pas irréalistes d’autant plus que ce groupe n’est pas seulement virtuellement lié au salafisme jihadiste ; sa participation dès 2003 – bien qu’à petite échelle – à l’activisme jihadiste en Irak est avérée tant au niveau de son embrigadement d’islamistes palestiniens que libanais 63. Elles ne sont pas irréalistes enfin lorsque l’on saura que peu de temps avant sa mort, et dans un message audio diffusé sur Internet, Zarkawi avait vertement critiqué le Hezbollah en considérant qu’il servait comme un « bouclier protecteur à l’ennemi sioniste face aux attaques des mujâhidîn [sunnites] à partir du Liban 64 ». En tentant de « décrédibiliser » l’aptitude jihadiste du Hezbollah, ce message s’inscrit sans nul doute à notre sens dans une optique de surenchère identitaire (tournant autour du « meilleur jihadisme » en présence sur la scène islamique), destinée à « marquer des points » contre le parti khomeyniste libanais dans le cadre de la conquête des cœurs et des esprits islamiques.
Verve explosive du Hezbollah contre le salafisme jihadiste et recentrage sur la Palestine
Avant même la charge verbale zarkawiste à son encontre, les attentats-suicides d’août 2003 et de mars 2004 vont amener le Hezbollah à changer sensiblement son approche de la scène irakienne. S’il y a maintien absolu des critiques à l’encontre des Etats-Unis, il y a aussi plus grande attention au niveau des assignations données aux « opérations armées » (elles ne sont plus automatiquement catégorisées en tant qu’» actions de résistance ») et dépréciation explicite du salafisme jihadiste.
« Lors de la commémoration de la mort de Sayyed Hakim, j’ai dit et aujourd’hui je répète : si le Mossad ou la CIA sont derrière ces attentats, cela constituera une consolation pour nous tous. Mais si derrière se tient un groupe extrémiste et sclérosé qui vit encore au Moyen-Age, qui n’a ni raison ni cœur, ni religion ni morale et qui prétend relever de l’islam… C’est là le grand danger et la tragédie que doit confronter l’Umma. […] Je vous assure que tout groupe sclérosé dont la religion est la mort et le versement du sang est honni de la part des sunnites avant les chiites. […] Qui exécute donc des opérations-martyre et suicide de nos jours à part les “gens dogmatisés” ? […] C’est là une marque fondamentale qui pointe [sur l’identité des instigateurs] 65 ».
Le souci du Hezbollah de marginaliser identitairement les instigateurs est – outre son caractère véridique – de mise pour juguler toute fitna, encourager une condamnation « sunnite » sans appel des attentats et sauvegarder son capital de sympathie panislamique. Or nous l’avons vu, ce capital dérive en grande partie de son approche de la question palestinienne, d’où la nécessité pour lui de voir préservé le caractère fondamental de cette question dans l’imaginaire de l’Umma. Ainsi (et contrairement à Al Qaïda), c’est la Palestine et non l’Irak qui constitue la question centrale pour le parti et c’est elle qui détermine prioritairement son agenda 66. Dès lors, et face aux « manquements de résistance chiite en Irak » 67 et aux projets de fitna zarkawistes, l’entreprise de (re)focalisation du Hezbollah sur la Palestine relève, plus que jamais, d’une tentative de réorientation du « public islamique » vers la scène qui lui assure le plus de crédibilité, d’aisance et de sécurité identitaire. Après le coup retentissant de la libération de centaines de prisonniers des geôles israéliennes (fin janvier 2004) 68, l’assassinat par Israël, le 22 mars 2004, du guide spirituel du Hamas, cheikh Ahmad Yassin, donnera l’occasion au Hezbollah d’afficher à nouveau une solidarité sans faille avec cette cause (avec le pilonnage notamment des postes de Tsahal à Chebaa) 69.

Autorité spirituelle la plus respectée des chiites libanais, l’ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, 71 ans, né à Najaf en Irak, a été l’un des inspirateurs du Hezbollah. Il s’exprime sur la crise au Liban, alors que le Parlement doit élire aujourd’hui son président.

Le Liban est bloqué depuis plusieurs mois. Que faire pour éviter un embrasement ?
C’est très difficile de trouver une issue à cette crise tant que l’Amérique a plein de projets diaboliques vis-à-vis de la région. Voyez ce qui se passe en Irak. Aujourd’hui, tous les ingrédients d’une guerre sont réunis au Liban. Il est d’ailleurs extravagant d’entendre les parties en présence appeler au dialogue, tout en posant des entraves psychologiques et politiques [...]. On assiste actuellement au retour en force des fractions et des querelles entre les différentes communautés religieuses.
Va-t-on vers un affrontement chiites contre sunnites au Liban ?
Jusqu’à présent, il n’y a pas de divergence entre les sunnites et les chiites libanais. Certes, nous représentons l’opposition chiite à un gouvernement qui compte des sunnites. Notre problème, c’est que l’Amérique joue un rôle diabolique. Après avoir semé la discorde entre les sunnites et les chiites irakiens, les Américains aimeraient faire de même dans notre pays.
Comment s’y prendraient-ils ?
L’animosité historique à l’encontre des chiites dans le monde musulman est réapparue avec ce qui se passe en Irak. En outre, les chiites sont considérés comme des «infidèles» par les grands savants religieux sunnites saoudiens. Ce sont les sunnites wahhabites qui ont créé ce problème. Ce sont eux les premiers qui ont commencé à tuer les chiites et à faire exploser les mosquées chiites, leurs commerces ainsi que leurs lieux d’habitation.
Les chiites ne sont-ils pas aussi responsables des violences en Irak ?
Oui, mais après coup. Les savants du chiisme ont refusé dans un premier temps que les chiites tuent des sunnites. Puis, après la destruction, en 2006 à Samara [en Irak, ndlr], des tombeaux des deux imams que vénèrent les chiites, certains ont pris les armes. Pour se venger. Maintenant, c’est la folie de la vengeance. Ce n’est pas une question de fatwa. C’est une question de défense. Les sunnites, qu’ils soient d’Al-Qaeda ou proches de Saddam Hussein, ont déclaré la guerre aux chiites.
Les chiites du Liban sont financés par l’Iran qui veut devenir une puissance nucléaire…
Le projet nucléaire de l’Iran a pour but d’assurer les ressources énergétiques du pays, le pétrole étant en voie de diminution. Le problème, c’est que l’Amérique et l’Europe ne veulent pas que l’Iran possède la connaissance nucléaire scientifique. Or toutes les forces politiques et religieuses de ce pays refusent le nucléaire militaire. D’ailleurs, l’Iran a mis ses usines et ses capacités atomiques sous la supervision de l’Agence atomique mondiale. Ce qui n’est pas le cas d’Israël qui n’a jamais signé de convention sur l’armement nucléaire et refuse de le faire. Pourtant, les Israéliens ont l’arme nucléaire même s’ils le nient. Pourquoi l’Amérique ne bombarde pas l’Etat hébreu ? Pourquoi ne le désarme-t-il pas ? Pourquoi ne le met-il pas au ban des nations ?
Dans votre prêche, vous avez critiqué les médias occidentaux. Pourquoi ?
La presse européenne est sous pression de l’Amérique. Lors du conflit au Liban entre Israël et le Hezbollah, il y a eu aussi une guerre mondiale contre notre mouvement. Les occidentaux soutiennent toujours nos ennemis. Cette injustice nous a beaucoup blessés. Nous pensions que l’Europe était différente de l’Amérique, qu’elle pouvait prendre ses distances vis-à-vis de la politique américaine. Mais nous constatons que le Vieux Continent est sous l’influence de Washington qui vise à mettre la main sur le monde arabo-musulman, sur ses richesses naturelles, ses marchés de consommation et sur ses bases politiques et culturelles. Tous les chefs d’Etat européens sont à la solde de Bush.

By Ali El-Saleh, 25/11/2007
Gaza, Asharq Al-Awsat - Said Siyam, one of five high ranking members of Hamas who have been accused by Fatah of being behind the coup that occurred in the Gaza Strip and ended with Hamas exercising its full control on 14 June 2007.
Asharq Al-Awsat sat down with the man known as the "strongman of Hamas" for an in-depth interview:
[Asharq Al-Awsat] On my way to meeting you there was a march by the Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee. Are there serious efforts to achieve that reconciliation and return to the negotiation table, or is it no more than throwing the ball to the other side of the court?
[Siyam] From the first moment that followed the events we in Hamas were prepared for unconditional dialogue, and we said all matters can be discussed at the negotiation table. We do not have a veto on any matter. However, regrettably, the main obstacle is that the desire not to hold a dialogue is a US-Israeli decision. After the events, the Palestinian Authority[PA] represented by its president made its choice in favor of the Americans and the Israelis, and they became hostages of the US-Zionist decision in the matter of agreeing or not agreeing to the internal dialogue. That is the first point. The second is: There is an influential clique and a bad retinue around President Mahmud Abbas that rejects such a dialogue. The best evidence of that are the statements that are made by those figures every now and then to increase tension and to draw in many sides that are likely to deepen the discord.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] At the same time there are those on the other side who accuse Hamas figures including Said Siyam, Mahmud al-Zahhar, and others of taking a hard line and rejecting dialogue. They also accuse you of staging a coup in the Gaza Strip?
[Siyam] We are accustomed to such lies that are made by such types. When Hamas and all its institutions say Hamas is for dialogue it is no one's business to say this or that, for ultimately Hamas is an institution. However, we are talking about names that say no to dialogue on the side of Fatah and on the part of influential figures in the presidency. Let them try. We have informed all the Arab and international sides and all the factions and quarters that contact us of our readiness to have a dialogue. Therefore the problem is not with us in Hamas.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] A few days ago Abu-Mazin [Mahmud Abbas] stated to Asharq Al-Awsat that he has no problem [with having a dialogue] and that he contacted several Arab sides, and he is prepared to have a dialogue with Hamas for it is a main faction if Hamas hands over the institutions to the PA. Is Hamas prepared to hand over the institutions and what are its conditions in order to do that?
[Siyam] I want to make it clear that sometimes there are conflicting statements that need to be understood. Abu-Mazin also informed Arab sides to work first on persuading the United States, and that means the matter does not depend on his person. The story is not that Hamas is an obstacle. When we talk about institutions we ask do they belong to the PA or to Fatah. Isn't Hamas part of the PA? After the elections Hamas became no. 1in the Palestinian political system. Therefore the institutions he is talking about are a trust that is with us, we in Hamas in the Gaza Strip. However, it is not his right to have them handed over to him as a trustee over them, because we are part of the political system and part of the social fabric and part of the government, and consequently we are part of the PA. We are not talking about parts; we are talking about a number of issues that must be raised. Yet despite that we said we do not have a problem in having those institutions -- particularly the security services -- handed over to the apparatuses that will be reformed on professional and national bases. Moreover, there are institutions in which we do not have a presence other than protecting and guarding them.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Why does not Hamas undertake a goodwill initiative, contact Abu-Mazin and say to him: Mr. President, come to Gaza and take over Al-Muntada (the presidential headquarters) and the Hospitality Palace. Those are matters that concern the presidency. As for the other institutions they belong to everyone and can be discussed at the dialogue table.
[Siyam] First, where is the authority that will hand them over? In the Gaza Strip all the security services have been dissolved, so to whom do we hand over those bodies?
[Asharq Al-Awsat] I am not talking about institutions, but I mean the Al-Muntada (the presidency) and the Hospitality Palace.
[Siyam] Even the Al-Muntada. Who will take over the Al-Muntada from us?
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Abu-Mazin in his capacity as president will takeover. And you recognize him as president.
[Siyam] Will Abu-Mazin come to Gaza to be handed over the Al-Muntada?
[Asharq Al-Awsat] I am saying that Hamas takes the initiative and invite him. And let him refuse.
[Siyam] Why does not Abu-Mazin take the initiative by stopping the arrests of Hamas leaders and elements in the West Bank? Why does not Abu-Mazin take the initiative of reopening the charity societies and organizations that were closed down? Why does not Abu-Mazin take the initiative and stop the arrests and actions that aim to dismantle and fragment Hamas? Why the crocodile tears over buildings that are deserted and yet there are no tears for a movement, a resistance, institutions providing services, and the arrest of hundreds of leading figures and personages in the West Bank who are being tortured in the West Bank?
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Such a step could put the ball in Abu-Mazin's court?
[Siyam] Allow me to say that I view such an argument as oversimplification of the problem. I fully realize that the problem is not in the Al-Muntada or the Hospitality Palace which we are protecting and caring for more than we protect and care for our homes. The issue is bigger than that. We do not want to taken in on the pretext of good intentions or goodwill initiatives. We have experience. We have taken the initiative [in the past]. When he met with Abu-Mazin after the Mecca Agreement, brother Abu al Abd (Ismail Haniyeh), the Prime Minister, surprised everyone by tendering his resignation as a gesture of good intention. That initiative was misunderstood, and none of the clauses of the Mecca Agreement were implemented except the clause on forming a national unity government.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] How was that resignation construed?
[Siyam] In the March 2005 Cairo Agreement we had another experience. The PA and Fatah agreed to a number of conditions in order to have one of the conditions implemented before they disavowed the other conditions. For instance, the 2005 truce agreement was adopted but none of the other clauses of the Cairo Agreement were implemented. In the Mecca Agreement, the clause on forming the unity government was implemented while none of the other clauses were adopted. We have a series of calamities. I am not here to throw the ball or to put the president in a corner. I am talking very clearly. We are prepared to discuss matters here or in any Arab or Muslim country and to have all the points raised for discussion. We don't have a veto on any issue. I do not want to jump in the air with a proposal or take a futile step. Who will take over those institutions or that palace o that house while I am ruling the Gaza Strip now? I have been transferred to the national security service which is originally a presidency apparatus. Abu-Mazin's house and also the house of Umm-Jihad (Intisar al-Wazir, Khalil al-Wazir's wife [widow and a former minister] - the house is adjoining to Abu-Mazin's house in Gaza) as well as the Hospitality Palace are now under the command of the Palestinian National Security [service], which is a presidential security establishment that is open to all visitors, bodies, and establishments. You yourself asked to visit those places and we allowed you.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] We are not oversimplifying matters. However there is a real dilemma and split in the Palestinian arena. There is a complete blockade of the Gaza Strip and you I think reject it, and we are trying to get rid of it. The blockade must end. He who takes the initiative to rid the Palestinian people of this dilemma may win a round against the other side.
[Siyam] We took the initiative and said yes to dialogue. Their initiative was to say no to dialogue. We said: Unconditional dialogue. They said: A dialogue on such and such conditions. If anyone must apologize it is Abu-Mazin who should apologize to the Palestinian people, not Hamas. That is because it is Abu-Mazin who backed those leaders and elements, although we warned him, and many others including leaders from within Fatah have also warned him. We placed the facts before him and he did not lift a finger. Despite that, we did not place any conditions, and for us everything is open.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] The present situation leads to distancing Hamas from the Palestinian people, particularly as we are about to have a conference that could be fateful for the Palestine cause, the Annapolis conference.
[Siyam] Hamas is in the government but it does not rule. When we were in the 10th government (the Hamas government that preceded the unity government), the president did not participate with us in any meeting or visit on any level for a whole year. He worked separately from us. The reality in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank is not new, because complications have been in a state of ebb and flow with regard to the complications and the suffering that is increasing. Here I would like to put on record that the suffering or part of the suffering in the Gaza Strip is the result of a Palestinian decision - the decision of Abu-Mazin and the Ramallah government.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] What proof do you have of that?
[Siyam] The best proof of that is what happened at the United Nations where Palestine was represented by the international community on the basis that Hamas is an outlaw and is treated as being outside international law. A good proof of that are the (closed) crossings and the sick people who die there, the dearth in supplies, the cutting off of all operational material, and preventing pilgrims from traveling. It is not a secret, and you the media know the truth even though you may not have material evidence or a legal instrument but there is a consensus over it. The Gaza Strip is also blockaded by Palestinians. However, although four months have passed and there were wagers that Hamas will not persevere and stand fast, I say we stood fast and we are prepared to stand fast for long months and provide the people with what we can. Ultimately we are confident that by the resilience and steadfastness of the Gaza Strip and our good administration the siege will break down and the Gaza Strip will triumph over the besiegers.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you not fear the possibility that there will be an eruption of anger against Hamas in the Gaza Strip?
[Siyam] You are in Gaza; have you felt any signs of an eruption? There are no such signs, and if there is anything it is the rallying of the masses around Hamas and around the government and its distinguished performance. Matters are heading positively toward correcting all the mistakes and transgressions of the past. Even the friction and the practices that were planned by some sides in Fatah have failed to provoke the public. The minimum [needs] are available to the people. There is suffering, that is true, but the Palestinian people have been accustomed to such suffering for about 60 years. In the West Bank the occupying forces are - alongside the Palestinian Authority forces - arresting the strugglers and that is a mark of disgrace in the history of the PA.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] There are fears that Hamas will dominate the West Bank, and some people say had it not been for Israel's presence Hamas would have been able to do so?
[Siyam] It is not on Hamas's agenda nor is it in its culture to dominate the Gaza Strip. We were truthful when we said that what happened was merely that security had deteriorated to the state we know. As the Prime Minister (Haniyeh) said, the Gaza Strip is a trust and we had a choice: either we allow it to head toward destruction or we shoulder our responsibility inputting the house in order and institutionalize it. What annoyed them is that Hamas was able to re-institutionalize work in the Gaza Strip in all fields, including the security services, the judiciary, the courts, and other institutions. They promote such rumors in the West Bank in order to find justification for the ferocious campaign that is being waged against Hamas. We did not come on the back of tanks. The weapons we possessed two years ago are the same weapons that are with us at present. Those weapons were not used to bring us to power, for we came to power through the ballot box. If we wanted to stage a coup we would have done so during the campaign against us in 1996, a campaign that involved pursuit, arrests, assassinations, dismantling of institutions, and so on. The people may be patient with such excesses - as brother Haniyeh said - but they will not remain patient indefinitely.
However, we repeat that it is not a matter of domination. We basically are a resistance movement under occupation. The PA is not a real state or a real authority or a real government. All those political meanings are for us in Hamas part of the philosophy of resistance. However, if matters remain as they are, no one will be able to stand in the way of an explosion in the West Bank. America with all its power and vigor was unable to maintain security in Iraq, because the Iraqi people do not embrace the occupiers, they embrace the resistance.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] At the same time there are those who say that after halting its operations Hamas is now seeking to cut off the wings of the Resistance, through its confrontations with Islamic Jihad and by destroying its rocket factories. Not only that, but under the cover of resistance, Hamas is meeting with the Israelis. Abu-Mazin has reaffirmed that to Asharq Al-Awsat.
[Siyam] Abu-Mazin said Hamas supports Al-Qaeda in the Gaza Strip and he knows quite well that it is not true. By such words he only aims to harm Hamas. As for resistance the reality refutes his words. Hamas daily offers martyrs in the Gaza Strip, and side by side with other forces it resists Israeli incursions. Who carried out the Snake Catching [Sayd al-Afai] operation? Hamas. In the course of a few days Hamas killed four Israeli soldiers and wounded several others. Hamas has not arrested anyone for engaging in resistance. Give the name of one person from Islamic Jihad, Fatah, or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP] who was arrested because he was resisting. On the contrary, a mistake occurred a few days ago when a quantity of bullets was seized. It was thought it was destined for a family to create anarchy, but it transpired that it was for the PFLP. The bullets were returned to the PFLP whose activity in the resistance field is low. The background of the incident that occurred with Islamic Jihad in Rafah was not one of resistance but a road accident. A Jihad member ran over a pedestrian with his car and then refused to appear at the police station. The literature of the Resistance - Fatah, the PFLP, and Islamic Jihad - all say that Hamas is the spearhead of the Resistance, and any harm that befalls Hamas befalls the entire Resistance in Palestine. Who is arresting those hunted among the Izzaldin al-Qassam Brigades in the West Bank? Is it not the PA? Who is besieging the Resistance and who has signed an agreement on decommissioning the resistors' weapons?
[Asharq Al-Awsat] When I said to Abu-Mazin that he exercised authority as a faction [Fatah] against Hamas in the West Bank, he said that is not true and that he began the action against the Al-Aqsa Brigades, Fatah's military wing, and that he is entitled to move similarly against Hamas...
[Siyam, interrupting] Can I ask a question?
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Please do.
[Siyam] How many Fatah elements have been arrested by the PA in the West Bank? Very few compared to the hundreds of Hamas detainees? They are evening dismantling [Hamas's] political organization and the Al-Da'wah [The Call], which is an administrative organization that has no connection with the Resistance. They are bargaining with the resistors over their weapons, and they are asking them to hand over their weapons in return for releasing them. That happened in Janin and Tulkarm in the northern West Bank. It is easy for a person to make any accusation in the market but it is difficult for him to prove it. As for Hamas meeting with Israelis, I will not say it is incorrect, but I will say it is a blatant lie. Hamas is a strong movement, and when it wants to meet with Israelis and others it will declare that publicly for it is its own master, and it is elected and the master of the Resistance in Palestine, and has nothing to hide. If he has the names of persons who met with Israelis let him disclose them. If Hamas itself has denied it and so has Israel, why this strange insistence? Perhaps they fear someone will compete with them in meeting with the Israelis. We say to them rest assured, let them monopolize such meetings and good luck to them.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] I have heard rumors that Hamas fines anyone who sings at weddings, and especially those who sing songs for Samih al-Madhun (a Fatah member who was executed by Hamas during the operation to take control of Gaza)?
[Siyam] I hear that from you, but I have not heard before. When you leave my house you will see yellow flags (Fatah flags, and he asked his guards to show them to me). The owner of the house on which the Fatah flags are flying invited me to their wedding. I sent them a bouquet of flowers and they sang a song for Samih al-Madhun at the wedding. Those accusations are not true. We only ban the firing of gunshots [in the air] at weddings. I think any state in the world will support us in that, because the result is that victims fall and people are frightened. It is an uncivilized scene. We have succeeded to a great extent in relieving society of such practices. As for singing, they can sing whatever they want. Their press is free to say what it wants. Al-Hayah al-Jadidah as well as Al-Ayam and Al-Quds enter the Gaza Strip although those newspapers vilify us and lie about the government. Observe their press conferences that are broadcast directly from Gaza in which they call on Hamas to back down. No one touches them. Fatah leaders in the Gaza Strip meet and no one touches them or harasses them.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Why such importance has been given to Samih al-Madhun who is now considered a symbol of Fatah's resistance to Hamas's influence in the Gaza Strip? Is it because of the way in which he was killed? Did he commit ugly crimes so that he deserves such a death?
[Siyam] I will not stoop to such a level.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Did he commit ugly crimes to deserve such a death?
[Siyam] Let us have a neutral investigation into the crimes committed by Samih al-Madhun and his group for those crimes which included killings and indescribable torture. There is a recording of Samih al-Madhun's voice that was broadcast by Fatah's Youth Radio. The tape exists and you can obtain it. In it he boasts of burning civilian homes to the ground. Al-Madhun ended the interview saying: Excuse me, I have to go to continue with the burning. That is Samih al-Madhun. Can Fatah deny that? His heroism in Fatah stems from the extent of his hostility to Hamas and the crimes he committed against Hamas elements and others. He killed people just because they had grown a beard. I do not want to talk about him as though he is a national hero.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] It is also said in Ramallah that you banned hubble-bubble cafes and more than doubled the price of cigarettes: from 12 to24 shekels for a packet of cigarettes and from 4 to 40 shekels for a box of hubble-bubble tobacco. Since Hamas elements do not smoke, the action is interpreted as burdening Fatah members with the price increase.
[Siyam] So that they behave and stop smoking (he said it jokingly). Regrettably, the media focuses on issues that should not be raised because they are not the essence...
[Asharq Al-Awsat] But they are matters that are raised in the street?
[Siyam] In light of the dearth in substances that enter the Gaza Strip it is natural for prices to rise. There are commodities whose prices have risen in the world, such as wheat. The price of fuel oil has increased as a result of the rise in oil prices. Hamas does not control the prices of such commodities. We do not price goods. For instance, you can have a vendor who sells a kilo of cucumbers for one shekel while another vendor sells it for two shekels. I cannot force him to sell it for one shekel. The tax on cigarettes is deducted from the importers in favor of the Ramallah authority. However, if some people are caught attempting to smuggle a large quantity of cigarettes through the crossings Hamas levies a customs tax on them, and that is our right as a government.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Regarding financial issues, how does Hamas arrange its financial affairs and how does it pay the salaries of employees, the police, and members of the security forces? The US Congress claimed that Hamas collects from $12 million to $20 million a month in revenues.
[Siyam] That is absolutely incorrect.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Then how do you arrange your financial situation?
[Siyam] Is Hamas a shop or a movement? Hamas is a movement that has its extensions and is a political address in the world. It is courted and countries and presidential palaces are opened to it. Thus it is not a movement from nothing or a nihilist movement. We have income and revenues from inside the country and the government can secure part of the money from the aid it collects to break the blockade. The expenditure of the Gaza Strip was assessed on the basis of the financial squandering and the thefts that used to take place. The Gaza Strip does not need $50 million to $60 million a month to arrange its matters. The fact is it does not need more than $5 million to $6million a month, more than half of which comes from revenues. We pay the salaries of those whose salaries have been cut off while they pay the salaries of their people. Yet when we were in the 10th government we - and I was one of them - used to come loaded with bags full of money to feed our people. The first people we used to feed were 90% of the Fatah guys and we did not stop anyone's salaries, not even the salaries of those who were hostile to us. However, one of the first actions of the prospective government in Ramallah was to fight people in their livelihood believing the people will turn against Hamas. However, God provides us and the people.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Is there cooperation between Hamas and the Egyptian authorities, at least with regard to the people who have been stranded at the crossing points?
[Siyam] Contacts have not been severed. However, there have been no official visits after the [June] events.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] There are people who are [were] stranded at the Rafah crossing [between the Gaza Strip and Egypt]. There were Hamas leaders in Egypt and other states that were able to cross into the Gaza Strip after the border was closed as a result of what took place in Gaza. I mention in particular [MP and Hamas spokesman] Mushir al-Masri. How did they return and by which crossing?
[Siyam] Al-Masri was not the only person who returned to the Gaza Strip. All those who were stranded returned.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Did that take place through the Rafah crossing?
[Siyam] Not, not through the Rafah crossing but through the Rafah border, because the Egyptian brothers did not want the opening of the Rafah crossing to be held against them if they open it. We did not enter through the crossing's buildings but we entered from another side and through coordination. I personally returned through the Rafah crossing. When the Rafah crossing was closed I was in Damascus. Thus I was not behind the decision to resolve the situation in the Gaza Strip [on 14 June 2007] as they claim, because at that moment I was outside the Gaza Strip. I heard about the resolution of the situation on the radio like other people. To return to the issue of the Rafah crossing, many of those stranded could not get through because they were wanted by Israel. That is why the Egyptian government thankfully agreed to their crossing through the border.

by Huda al Husseini, 24/08/2007, Huda al Husseini is a prominent Lebanese writer.
This is a season of attacks by individuals who seek to cause distress in the region in order to consolidate their positions and goals in Lebanon.
With the "celebrations" that have spread in Lebanon to mark the first anniversary of the war between Israel and Hezbollah, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah delivered three speeches that were broadcast from Ba'labakk, Bint Jubayl and the Southern Suburb of Beirut.
In his three speeches which were not delivered in person, Nasrallah focused on the quantity of rockets that are now in Hezbollah's possession. This caused horror among the Lebanese people as they wondered where Nasrallah wanted to take Lebanon! As he delivered his second speech, the Lebanese people noticed that a large number of those considered allies of Hezbollah and, consequently, should express their jubilation with what they heard from the Hezbollah secretary general, opted to appear on television stations that are affiliated with or support Hezbollah to attack Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Abdulaziz Khujah.
The attacks against Saudi Arabia coincided with reports that France had put a stop to the French initiative that reportedly sought to convene a regional-international conference with the participation of Syria to resolve the Lebanese problem.
These attacks also followed a conference on Iraq held in Syria to discuss the security situation in that country, which Saudi Arabia boycotted. Some Lebanese agents "accredited" [by Syria] said, among other things, that Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Khujah and the US Ambassador Geoffrey Feltman were the only diplomats who were acting in Lebanon to cause divisions among the Lebanese parties and to prevent them from meeting. These agents did not say that if there were a Syrian ambassador in Lebanon, problems would probably decrease. They also said that they "received information" that the international conference for which US President George Bush called for to discuss the Palestinian problem would convene only to provide an occasion for a photo of a handshake between the Saudi monarch, King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz, and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.
In his third speech delivered on 14 July, Nasrallah said that he had prepared a "surprise" for Israel that would change the face of the region. This "surprise" came as a surprise to the Lebanese people of whom some were convinced that Hezbollah might have nuclear weapons! Horror struck deep among the Lebanese who have not yet repaired the damage caused by last year's war. Others believed that the "surprise" might indicate Hezbollah's possession of chemical weapons. According to informed sources, Iranian military officials in the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps and Syrian officials last year entertained the notion of trying the use chemical weapons. These officials sought to push Hezbollah to use the Zilzal rockets, which carry chemical weapons, on a small-scale. This is why in the early days of the war the Israeli military aircraft concentrated on bombarding these rockets and their bases, having received confirmed reports that Hezbollah was planning to use chemical weapons. According to this information, Nasrallah was in Damascus a few days before the 1ast July attack [on Israeli patrol to capture 3 Israeli soldiers]. He voiced his concern that Israel might react by invading Lebanon, should he give the order to abduct Israeli soldiers. However, the Syrians and the Iranian Islamic Revolution Guards Corps--Al-Quds Brigades--proposed that should retaliate against any Israeli attempt at invasion by firing rockets carrying chemical weapons, This , they said, would have a resounding impact because the Israelis were not provided with gas masks.
When the conflict broke out, Israeli aircraft destroyed the Iranian Zilzal rockets and foiled Hezbollah's attempt to use chemical weapons. In the wake of Nasrallah's speech in which he revealed his "surprise," two developments worth noting occurred: First, the fiery attack that Syrian Vice President Faruq Al-Shara launched against Saudi Arabia prompted the Lebanese people to understand the significance of the preliminary attack begun by those Lebanese agents "accredited" by Syria. The second was Washington's announcement that it was considering placing the Islamic Revolution Guards Corpse on the list of terrorist organizations. Everyone, near and far, knows that since its establishment early in the 1980s, Hezbollah owes its weapons, training and funding to the Iranian Islamic Revolution Guards Corps. During last year's war, officers from this corps assisted Hezbollah's fighters and kept the military supply lines across Syria open. Nasrallah's anticipated "surprise" seems to have played a basic role in the US thinking that might turn into action next month. This mere thinking dealt a psychological blow to Iran because it affected its legitimacy as a regime. This thinking has also caused confusion in Syrian circles. Then came the announcement by Netherlands's Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen's that his country is ready to host the international tribunal to try the killers of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. It is to be recalled that in 2005, leaks from the draft report prepared by Detlev Mehlis, [head of the International Independent Investigation Commission], for the United Nations noted that five senior Syrian officials were implicated in the bombing of the Al-Hariri's motorcade. And last month, Serge Brammertz pointed out that his team obtained names of a number of people who played a role in the attack on Al-Hariri, along with names of others who participated in other assassinations that were perpetrated in Lebanon.
Then came the resounding statement of Faruq al-Shara against "paralyzed" and "submissive" Saudi Arabia. All Lebanese parties, both in the opposition and government, realized the significance of this statement, as Al-Shara's political future is contingent upon having a Lebanese president, chosen by Syria, assume this post so that Syria can emphasize its actual influence in Lebanon, notwithstanding the withdrawal of its army. Al-Shara cannot lose every time he makes a bet. For before the assassination of Al-Hariri he said: "The Syrian troops will stay in Lebanon for two years," but only two months later the Syrian troops were withdrawn from Lebanon. He now said: "Israel knows that we do not wish to wage war, that Syria will always be ready to retaliate should Israel attack it, but that Syria will not be the first to start an attack. "Meanwhile, Turkish officials advised Israel to distinguish between Syria and Iran because the two countries differ over regional issues. They also told Israel that "achieving peace with Syria would be easier than achieving it with the Palestinians. "In his fiery statement, Al-Shara also attacked President Bush's initiative, saying that Syria will not participate in the international conference even if it were invited. No invitations have so far been extended to any party to attend the proposed conference. On July 1, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallim said: Syria is ready to participate in an international conference on the Middle East under the auspices of the United States. He repeated this statement during his visit to India last week, when he urged Indian companies to invest in Syria and establish joint enterprises to benefit from "the climate of stability and security Syria enjoys under the leadership of President Bashar al-Assad." Wedo not know if during his visit to India al-Muallim was aware that a delegation of Muslim Indian leaders was touring Israel to spread the message of peace.
Maulana Jameel Ahmed Ilyasi, secretary-general of the All-India Association of Imams and Mosques, which includes 500,000 imams throughout India, said during his tour of Israel. We do not know whether Faruq al-Shara would accuse the Muslims of India totaling 147 million of being "agents" of Israel, or whether neither India nor its Muslims have any effect as long as Syria's road to Lebanon does not pass through India or its imams. It is regrettable that Syria is acting to turn Lebanon into an arena for conflict with Saudi Arabia. It seems that Syria insists on torpedoing the situation in Lebanon if it fails to re-impose its influence there. Syria believes that hosting a two-day security conference on Iraq in Syria was enough to end its international isolation and secure recognition of its role in Lebanon. Syria aspires to use the negotiations over Iraq to get political concessions in Lebanon and end its isolation through normalization of ties with the United States. Perhaps the motive for this stance is that the Syrian regime is aware that the United States and Israel tacitly want to maintain Bashar al-Assad's regime for fear of the unknown, particularly the Islamists, (the Muslim Brotherhood). Since the Syrian regime is not facing an impending danger, Al-Shara felt that raising the tone of accusations against Saudi Arabia and its role in Lebanon might prompt Washington, through Canada, the other secret mediator, to agree that Syria help restore calm in Iraq in return for offering Lebanon to Syria, this time on a red silver platter. The Lebanese people expect the worst to happen in the months ahead, and they do not rule out the possibility of bombings and assassinations against politicians, journalists, and even businessmen. Now that last year's war, the crippling of the government institutions, and the striking at the economy have all failed to bring to knee a large segment of the Lebanese, we have begun to hear leaks about postponing the election of a Lebanese president for over two years. For according to Al-Shara promise to President Al-Assad, Syria will continue to push for the formation of the so-called Lebanese national unity government so that this government can control the notional and presidential decision-making, even if "a half if formed a half hour before the election of a Lebanese president." Lebanon would thus head to the unknown, just as the "nationalists" had previously been in control of the war decision. Will the winds blow as Al-Shara wishes them to? Thanks to Al-Shara's efforts, not one single Arab country with normal relations with all Arab countries has such normal relations with Damascus to allow it to play the honest broker.
It seems that the conference on Iraq that was held in Syria has not convinced the Americans despite Damascus's efforts to demonstrate the Syrian president's openness to peace with Israel or its attempts to attract US attention to its "pivotal" role in the region. US Democratic Senator for Connecticut, Joseph Lieberman published an article in the Wall Street Journal on 20 July under the headline "Syria, the Al-Qaeda Travel Agency." He said: "When congress convenes next month, we must tell the Syrian regime, as we told the Iranian regime last month, that the passing of Al-Qaeda suicide bombers from Syrian to Iraq is unacceptable and must cease."Russia might resume its "courting" of Syria, but this does not change the reality that Syria and Iraq are about to fall in the Iranian lap. Syria will resort to "everything" to restore its powerful influence in Lebanon. But Lebanese, Saudi Arabia, the European Union, the United States, the United Nations and the international tribunal will be lying in wait for Syria. We hope that there will be no return to the days when a Lebanese was accused of siding with Israel if he was not siding with Syria.

A Crisis in Pan-Arabism's Beating Heart
by Mshari Al-Zaydi, 25/08/2007, A Saudi journalist and expert on Islamic movements and Islamic fundamentalism as well as Saudi affairs. Mshari is Asharq Al-Awsat’s opinion page Editor, where he also contributes a weekly column. Has worked for the local Saudi press occupying several posts at Al -Madina newspaper amongst others. He has been a guest on numerous news and current affairs programs as an expert on Islamic extremism.
The recent Saudi-Syrian ‘dispute’ has reshuffled the cards; scattering some, while reorganizing others.
Affiliated to the 8 March Coalition Forces, the Lebanese ‘As-Safir’ newspaper was the first to introduce the term ‘dispute’ to the relations between the two states. However, this was unfortunate timing given the upcoming presidential elections in Lebanon. The Lebanese ‘goodwill intermediary’ Nabih Berri had heavily relied on the Saudi-Syrian close proximity to help reconcile between the authority and the opposition in Lebanon. The intention was finding a president that would be agreed upon by all parties  but Shara’s winds have blown counter to the desire of Berri’s ships.
Saudi Arabia’s sharp statement against Syrian policy, and more specifically against Syrian Vice-President Faruq al Shara, perturbed the regime in Damascus, which is unaccustomed to such severity expressed by Saudi Arabia in the media. Within a day or two, two Syrian clarifications emerged: the first was a ‘quasi-reply’ to the Saudi statement, which said: We will not respond. What was said is untrue. Refer to the text of Faruq al Shara’s interview; it will suffice.
The second statement was issued last Sunday, 19 August, but this time with a calmer tone. Stressing the importance of Saudi-Syrian relations, it also upheld that al Shara’s statements had been “unjustly distorted and misconstrued”, which in accordance with Arab media is an indirect apology.
Regardless, in essence, the situation has surpassed this media clash to indicate a more grave and dangerous dimension: political clashes over regional issues. It has become evident that concealing the clash between Saudi and Syria has become impossible to hide. The chasm of discord has widened since the collapse of the Baathist regime in Iraq, amidst fears that the Syrian Baathist regime will suffer the same fate. Moreover, prior to that the Syrian regime had started to gradually lose some of its clout in the state by virtue of the efforts of the resistance forces in Lebanon.
This conflict peaked with the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and after accusing fingers were pointed at the security system affiliated to Syria in Lebanon. This is in addition to what followed of a series of actions, especially following the UN Security Council resolution 1559 (September 2004), which stated upon the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon.
However, the current Saudi-Syrian controversy has come out of the shadows and into broad daylight  what was once whispered in is now announced loud and clear. The reason for this is because the discord is one over policies and visions between Damascus and Riyadh. The Syrian regime during Bashar al Assad’s term has been linked in a fully strategic manner to the fundamentalist regime in Tehran, and has become the bridge that links between Hezbollah (the Iranian island in Lebanon) and the sources of funding, armament and guidance in Iran.
Of course, the Syrian regime is haggling over these services. It wants from Hezbollah, which has been fuelled and nourished by the Iranian revolution ideologically and militarily, services that are similar to those sought by the Iranian regime. For is it not, the Syrian regime that is, Tehran’s ally in sickness and in health?!
But likewise, Iran too wants a multitude of complex services from Syria; it is struggling in Iraq against Sunni parties and forces, and even non-Sunni movements, such as the Shiaa al Fadhila party (Islamic Virtue Part).
As such, Syria’s sabotage of the political situation in Iraq and its dispatch of suicide bombers over there serves the same aim as Iran’s endeavors in Iraq. The overt slogan raised by both regimes is: resisting the American occupation, and who can undermine the sanctity and purity of that noble resistance?!
However, in the complexity of these paths and the entanglement of various threads between the nationalists and the fundamentalists, the Sunnis and the Shiaa, and between the overlaps of which party is more envious of the other or more devoted to its Arab identity raises the question of Syria’s Arab identity: What does the Syrian regime really want?!
Does Syria still retain its position as the ‘throbbing heart of Arabism”? Or has that heart suffered a cardiac arrest?
But away from the notion of nationalism for now with all its definitions, ailments, and those who had used it as a vehicle to further their own interests or to eliminate personal enemies under its name, or even attacked reform in their own nation using it as a pretext. Away from the reality of this idea in this part of the world, and away from resisting the Islamic discourse addressing nations about the Arab national identity. Stepping away and distancing oneself from all these questions, the centrality of the ‘Levant’ must be acknowledged, in addition to its role in creating and endorsing the launch of Arab nationalism starting with Zaki al Arsuzi, Akram al Hourani, [Michel] Aflaq, and the Socialist Baath Party, which was responsible for creating Hafez al Assad’s regime. Al Assad was the first Alawite officer to reach the seat of power in the history of the Levant (1970).
What distinguished the political culture in Syria was the enduring talk and slogans raised championing nationalism and Arab unity. Battles unfolding between parties in the political game were conducted within the framework of the question: Who is the most faithful towards their Arab identity and sense of nationalism?
But following the passage of many stages to the incumbent Syrian President, Bashar al Assad, things have changed significantly. This is not by reason of Bashar’s close ties with Iran, along with his tight security circle. Indeed, Hafez al Assad had maintained a good relationship with Tehran even during the height of the Iraqi-Iranian war  the same war that was introduced to the Arab world as the new ‘Battle of al-Qadisiya’ against the Persians.
Hafez al Assad held the flag of nationalism in one hand, and interests of his own regime in the other. To the Arabs he justified his close proximity to Iran as one in which it played the role of a protector against Saddam’s Baghdad at the time. Meanwhile, whispers were circulating in the rumor mill about sectarian ties being forged between the Alawite Shiaa sect and the Shiaa of Tehran. And yet notwithstanding these rumors, senior clerics from the Twelver movement [the Shiaa Ithna ’Ashariyyah] do not recognize the legitimacy of the Alawite, Druze or Ismalili Shiaa sects, however politics has its own rules and the distant past follows its own logic.
What used to whispered inaudibly during Hafez al Assad’s days is now declared publicly in his son Bashar’s era, especially after the transformation of the relationship between Damascus and Tehran from one of an alliance to a relationship of subservience; Damascus being the submissive regime.
Scores of Iranians infiltrated into Syria; suffice it to say that the volume of Iranian staff members working on the Iranian diplomatic mission in Damascus is several hundred! Talk of political Shiism campaigns is constant. Al Jazeera online related that some time ago that those attending the Friday prayer sermon of Syrian Jurist Wahba al Zuhaili (among them preachers) said that al Zuhaili had warned against the threat posed by these campaigns in one of the towns of al Raqqa governorate, located northeast of Damascus. He furthermore urged people to verify this information.
In an online interview with Al Jazeera, the director of al Khesrofia secondary jurisprudence school, Sheikh Mahmoud Quul Aghassi said that the story had started in al Raqqa after Iranian institutions had built shrines for the Prophet’s companion Ammar Bin Yasser and his disciple Uwais al Qarni, both of whom enjoy an elevated status in the Shiaa vision of Islamic history. He also added that they had opened up a cultural office and had set up a cassette tape sale booth.
However, it does not stop there. There is talk buzzing about another strange phenomenon that has manifested in Syrian society; the proliferation of the ‘Qubaisiat’ women. Attributed to Sunni female preacher Munira al Qubaisi, this school of thought follows a Shafie Sunni path with Sufi inclinations and is fast spreading among the women in Syria  and even outside of it. Yet, Damascus remains to be the uncontested center of the movement.
The ideology of the movement preaches an extremist outlook to women that destroys all their past achievements towards openness and renaissance. According to ‘al Hayat’ newspaper, 70,000 females are affiliated to this movement (6 May 2003). Incidentally, among the Qubaisi movement is Ahmed Gibril’s sister; Gibril is the founder and leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC). This is not to mention the flexibility in the Jihadi Salafist trend...
Yet, the question remains: What identity does the Damascus regime seek to endorse?
The Syrian foreign policy is undoubtedly of a Shiaa strain, while internally a battle is simmering between an unyielding Sunni extremism, as represented by the female followers of the Qubaisi movement, and a politicized Shiism, such as the active movements in al Raqqa and elsewhere. Adonis [eminent Syrian poet] expressed his distress in an article he wrote for ‘al Hayat’ newspaper regarding the prevalence of the ‘Qubaisiat’ women; whose influence has spread far and wide to Kuwait, Lebanon and Jordan. Meanwhile, the Shiism campaigns have equally disturbed the Sunni preachers who have publicly expressed their disapproval and opposition internally.
So what is left of Arabism and nationalism, and is that heart still throbbing?
To sum it up; we do not reject actions that are based on purely nationalistic premises because that is precisely what is required. However, we must be aware of the contradiction between the declared slogans and the current reality on the ground.
Whenever slogans are raised high and the voices that chant them ring loud; I always believe that something secretive and discreet is happening behind the scenes. Perhaps this is the case in Syria and elsewhere.

If Only Nasrallah Would!
by Tariq Alhomayed, 26/08/2007, Tariq Alhomayed is the Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, the youngest person to be appointed that position. Mr. Alhomayed has an acclaimed and distinguished career as a Journalist and has held many key positions in the field including; Assistant Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, Managing Editor of Asharq Al-Awsat in Saudi Arabia, Head of Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper's Bureau-Jeddah, Correspondent for Al - Madina Newspaper in Washington D.C. from 1998 to Aug 2000. Mr. Alhomyed has been a guest analyst and commentator on numerous news and current affair programs including: the BBC, German TV, Al Arabiya, Al- Hurra, LBC and the acclaimed Imad Live’s four-part series on terrorism and reformation in Saudi Arabia. He is also the first Journalist to conduct an interview with Osama Bin Ladin's Mother. Mr. Alhomayed holds a BA degree in Media studies from King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, and has also completed his Introductory courses towards a Master’s degree from George Washington University in Washington D.C. He is based in London.
According to a report published in our newspaper a couple of days ago, Hezbollah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has moved out of his rented home to an undisclosed location in preparation for the rebuilding project slated for the Dahiya neighborhood destroyed by Israel's attack on Lebanon during last summer's thirty-six day war.
The story of the Dahiya quarter, or rather the "security compound", is much greater then that of a mere "leased home", and is more complex in its composition for it to be labeled as just a "residential neighborhood", for it is a sealed security area limited to Hezbollah, a story the people of Lebanon know only too well. But before celebrating the details of extensive renovation project, we wish Nasrallah would also restore the rest of Lebanon to its people.
What is meant here is that Lebanon, the nation, would serve the agenda of the Lebanese citizen and not that of Iran or Syria. The reconstruction of Lebanon will happen if Nasrallah chooses the unity of Lebanon, taking into account the composition of the country, which can only survive on its pluralism and the granting of others their space. Lebanon is an entangled country and the best solution for its dilemma would be not to manipulate it.
Today, the number of migrating Lebanese citizens is increasing; and this is not out of fear of escaping Israeli occupation but rather fleeing from the domestic absurdity which is tampering with the lives of Lebanese people, who are victims in this case.
Hezbollah has frequently wagered on the issues of resistance and the liberation of Lebanon. But today the party has run of credit and now must face the Lebanese people. and the should face their country's people knowing that last years war let to the deaths of approximately 1200 Lebanese , not to mention the damage and loss of properties!
Today, Hezbollah wants to wrap up Lebanon in its coat, turning against the pluralistic mosaic of the country.
Lebanon wants Syria out of Lebanon and demands a Syrian return to Lebanon in the form of an Ambassador with diplomatic relations just like other nations. Lebanon also wants Iran to stick to the rules of geography and remain behind their natural borders, instead of turning Beirut into a pawn, utilizing it according to political conflicts and ambitions of the Islamic Revolution. Yet the actions of Hezbollah resemble those of a Genie in a Magic Lantern, who pops up at Syria and Iran's beck and call saying "your wish is my command".
Furthermore, the news of Hezbollah's reconstruction project should not eclipse the news of them constructing their very own telephone network parallel to that of the official state. Building telephone networks is a new reality among movements and groups which work to eat away at their nations in the Arab world.
So now after accepting the fact that each group has its own flag, militia or army and television satellite channel, we now have to accept the establishment of one's own private telephone network as well.
I do hope Hassan Nasrallah would restore all of Lebanon to its people and their best interests, steering clear of subordination to any party.
Only then will Lebanon become a healthy state that breathes correct democracy and not the democracy of exclusion and the disruption of constitutional institutions. Restoring Lebanon to its people means reopening the doors of parliament, trying those accused of murder, respecting Lebanon's constitution and keeping Beirut free of foreign greed.

Hamas: A Lawless Authority
By Saleh al Naeimi, 25/08/2007

Gaza, Asharq Al-Awsat- Thick traffic congestion caused a blockage at the crossroads leading to the Nuseirat and Bureij refugee camps in the Gaza Strip. This disruption lasted for some time while motorists waited patiently in their cars. When our taxi neared the top of the traffic bottleneck, we discovered that it had been caused by a fight among a group of traders in the sheep market adjacent to the junction.
And yet, the first observation made by the people was the fact that those involved in this brawl were using sticks and stones – unlike the situation before Hamas seized control of Gaza and the clans would use bombs and guns to settle their accounts with one another in the streets.
Hamas movement managed to forcefully seize control of Gaza and confiscate all the weapons from the citizens whilst quelling the influential families and clans that were previously responsible for spreading chaos. However, despite these achievements, Hamas seems incapable of establishing all the required elements, for an integrated system; services have deteriorated to the worst state yet and one crisis is shortly followed by another. Residents of the city maintain that it has become “miserable and suffocated”.
However, the proponents of the new Palestinian regime uphold that Hamas are not behind Gaza’s “misfortunes”. They believe it is the outcome of the war that the international community had declared upon them, along with the embargo, which they believe is supported by what they describe as the “government in the West Bank”.
According to Khalil Abu Shamala, the director of al Damir human rights organization, Hamas appears to be, “an authority where law is absent as a result of a paralysis in the legislative tools, which are the police, general prosecution [headquarters] and the judiciary – all of which have been replaced by Hamas’s Executive Force. Nowadays, if you need the police, all you have to do is dial ‘109’ to get through to the Executive Force.”
While some of the citizens enthusiastically welcomed the iron grip represented by the Executive Force, others upheld that it posed a threat.
Abu Abdullah a shop owner in Gaza said, “The Executive Force has disciplined some people,” while Siham, a 25-year-old secretary, stated, “It’s true that the levels of crime have decreased but I believe it stems from fear rather than conviction.”
Commenting on the fighting that takes place, Abu Abdullah said, “Whenever the fighting broke out a few months ago, it was likely that a lot of people would get killed.” But Hamas has banned the custom of firing shots into the air, which people used to sometimes practice as a celebratory act during weddings and parties. Today, they use fireworks and crackers to express their joy.
The head of the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR) and lawyer, Raji al Surani, said of the situation in Gaza, “It has not been this safe in years.” The PCHR is the largest and most important human rights center in the Palestinian territories.
Volunteers from Hamas assist the Executive Force in controlling the flow of traffic on the city’s busy streets, while drivers have become more committed to adhering to the road rules. One of the members of the Executive Force chased a car for 500 meters for breaking a red light. Meanwhile, car thefts have decreased dramatically, however theft in general remains quite rampant in Gaza, which is facing major economic troubles. Aziz Ammar, a taxi driver, said of Hamas, “They are faithful, God-fearing people. They are not corrupt.”
But this steely control over security is countered by a chaos in daily life that is both relentless and ongoing, especially in the health and sanitation services. This degenerated significantly after the recent electrical power cut crisis; the EU had suspended it funding for the Gaza power plant last Friday on suspicion that electricity revenues were being diverted. The EU has since resumed fuel payments last Wednesday, much to the relief of 600,000 Palestinians in Gaza.
During the power outage, the residents of Gaza lived without electricity and water, while the garbage filled the city’s streets. In the Sahaba Street area, a number of sewer pipes burst, flooding the area with sewage and prompting residents to shut down their shops and pile gravel in front of their homes to prevent the water from seeping in. In North Gaza the sewage water had reached several meters high, while warnings that the area would soon be flooded.
Palestinian housewives would stay up late into the night to await the brief electrical supply so as to fill their water tanks. Many were complaining that the food had rotted in their fridges, including restaurant owners and those selling foodstuffs. The authorities expressed their concern over the likelihood of food poisoning given the rotting food and the hot weather.
Faisal Abu Shahla, head of the Oversight Committee in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and one of the top leaders of the Fatah movement in the Gaza Strip, rejected the opinion that security had become more stable. He told Asharq Al-Awsat, “This façade of calm in security is the aftermath of the fear that has consumed people following Hamas seizing control of the state security headquarters.”
He questioned the so-called stabilization in security in light of the fact that even MPs from the PLC were subjected to attacks and assaults since Hamas took hold of the reins in Gaza. Abu Shahla referred to the attack in which Ashraf Gomaa and a number of his companions were physically assaulted, furthermore accusing the Executive Force affiliated to Ismail Haniyeh’s government of being implicated and covering up its crime.
“Haniyeh’s government continues to conduct arrests for political reasons,” Abu Shahla said while citing the campaigns in which many of Fatah activists have been detained. He added that, “Hamas, along with its coup, has dealt the national project with a deadly blow.” He called for the competition between the two movements, Fatah and Hamas, to be one that could service the Palestinian people so that they could be the one’s to judge.
Islam Shahwan, the spokesman for the Executive Power told Asharq Al-Awsat that he is extending the invitation to the Fatah leadership to visit the prisons in Gaza, challenging them to find one prisoner who is detained for political reasons. He pointed out that there were some among the detainees who had been arrested for fraud and moral corruption.
Regarding the assault on Gomaa, Shahwan said that it had become clear that those who had attacked the Fatah parliamentarian were elements from the Fatah movement and that four of them had been arrested. “Why is there no action taken against Abu Mazen’s security apparatus, which is responsible for arresting leaders and activists from Hamas? They shoot them and burned their homes down, such as the case with Palestinian Parliamentary Speaker, Aziz Dweik, whose detention is contributing nothing to helping his family,” he said.
One of the signs of danger in the way Haniyeh’s government is the contradictory nature of the decisions issued by the government and its institutions. For example, the Executive Force enforces a ban on organizing marches without obtaining a clearance beforehand. The decision was denounced by the Palestinian factions and the human rights organizations, which prompted Haniyeh’s government to amend it. And yet Hamas had organized numerous marches and events to protest against the practices of the occupation, which would have required a permit.
Another contradiction lies in the decision issued by Haniyeh’s government to stop Attorney-General Ahmed al Maghni from practicing. Haniyah’s bureau was quick to state that al Maghni had not been detained or banned from practice, while spokesmen for the Executive Force had confirmed that al Maghni had indeed been temporarily suspended from practice and that they were investigating his implication in attempting to conceal corruption cases linked to leadership figures in the security apparatus. The prevalent conception is that the Executive Force operates autonomously from the instructions issued by Haniyeh’s government.
Regarding the economic conditions, there is a general consensus that conditions have deteriorated. There had been a slight improvement after [Palestinian Prime Minister Salam] Fayyad’s government paid the salaries of tens of thousands of employees, in addition to Haniyeh’s government paying salaries to the staff and elements of the Executive Force – which Fayyad’s government had refused to pay.
However, according to lawyer Raji al Surani, this reimbursement is negligible since unemployment in Gaza is 90 percent, which means that the segment that benefited from these salaries is but a tiny portion of the whole.
But Hamas tries to bridge this wide gap by providing services for the poor and needy through charities affiliated to the movement. Al Salah Society is an example of these charities. The charity’s director, Ali Nassar, told Asharq Al-Awsat that it had recently provided 80,000 meals for the needy, in addition to providing for 8,000 orphans.
However, Hamas abilities for provision are very limited. Gaza was engulfed in darkness for a week due to a power outage after the EU suspended payments for the power plant. This followed accusations that Hamas was trying to impose taxes on electricity bills with the intention of using the money to fund its own activities. However, the movement refuted these allegations and proceeded to point an accusing fingers at Fayyad’s government alleging that it had been intending to cut off electricity so as to incite the public against Hamas and provoke it into revolting.
The crisis ended after Hamas agreed to allow the EU to examine the electrical company’s records. But after Hamas was saved from a sea of darkness, it began to drown in huge heaps of garbage. The piles continued to grow on a daily basis because the local workers were on strike after they were not paid their salaries for several months. And once again, the citizens of Gaza were forced to pay the price of the conflict between Hamas and Fayyad’s government. Moreover, Hamas accused Fayyad’s government of retracting its pledge to pay the local workers’ salaries – they had not been paid for eight months running.
However, the greatest challenged posed by Hamas is Fayyad’s government’s insistence on making Friday and Saturday the official weekly days off, while Hamas is equally insistent that it only be Friday. Fayyad’s government threatened that it will not pay salaries to the employees who follow Haniyeh’s instructions, which means that most of the staff will follow Fayyad’s decision – even those who support Hamas.
Another great challenge will be confronted in the education sector with the advent of the new school year this coming September. There is enormous pressure on Haniyeh’s government, especially by Hamas’s elite, to change its position and accept Fayyad’s position. Hamas’s present opposition means a disruption in the educational process. Additionally, there is a reshuffling among school principles, courtesy of Haniyeh’s government since they do not abide by the instructions issued by it. Fatah supporters who work in these institutions organize demonstrations to protest against these appointments, which results in paralyzing the work, in addition to the banishing many of the workers whom Fayyad’s government had guaranteed salaries.
Hamas tries to fill the huge gap caused by the absence of employees in service institutions, such as the health sector, for example. There is a marked absence of staff in hospitals and medical institutions, as well as the police and licensing institutions, which abide by Fayyad’s instructions and which go against Haniyeh’s.
Meanwhile, Hamas has recruited thousands of volunteers to substitute for the lack of personnel. For example, the people responsible for managing the traffic on Gaza’s streets are secondary school students who are affiliated to the movement. Hamas has also started to integrate its elements into the sectors in which they have experience and qualifications, while its institutions cover the rest of the requirements and make up for the lack. The heath service institutions affiliated to Al Salah Society alone offer services to approximately 1,000 patients daily for nominal rates. Hamas is also undertaking the construction of houses that have been demolished by Israeli attacks, in addition to providing financial assistance to the farmers whose farms were destroyed by the Israeli occupation.
Charitable organizations affiliated to Hamas strive to provide a multitude of services, which results in strengthening the movement’s relationship with a large segment of Palestinian society. However, matters have remained unchanged in the health and education sectors; Hamas’s efforts have done little to compensate for the absent staff, which has resulted in an unprecedented paralysis in both domains.
On the cultural and artistic level, Hamas has accomplished much, especially in theater. ‘Al Aqsa’ satellite channel and ‘Al Aqsa’ radio, both of which are affiliated to Hamas, have a theater troupe that performs plays and comedy sketches. The comedy star, Nabil al Khatib, who enjoys local fame in Gaza, leads the troupe.
The radio station in Gaza airs various plays; one of which is based on the political, social and economic reality of the present day. One such play makes harsh criticism of the Executive Force whose members are notoriously known for their speeding on the road.
Distinguished author and political science professor Walid al Mudallal maintains that the movement’s interest in the arts indicates its open approach. Furthermore, he refutes claims that its motive is to set up an ‘Emirate’ like that of the Taliban in Afghanistan. He declared these claims as unfounded and illogical.
Al Mudallal added that the evidence proving that the two movements (the Taliban and Hamas) are different lies in the firm manner in which Hamas dealt with the groups that were stirring up trouble in Gaza recently. These groups were attacking Internet cafes, hair dressing salons and the Christian circles in Gaza, deeming them to be Western influence. But Hamas crushed them swiftly and put an end to such acts of violence. Al Mudallal also added that no action is taken against women who go to places of work or education without headscarves.
Whilst some people may be against Hamas movement, al Mudallal said, it was important to note that, “it [Hamas] does not in any way adopt the ideology or follow the same practices as al Qaeda.” According to him, the difference is that, “Hamas believes in the rules of democracy and voting, in addition to its awareness of the importance of consolidating its relations on a regional and global level, whereas al Qaeda is strongly against these two premises.” 

Le temps des bombes humaines
Le 18 avril 1983, une camionnette lestée de TNT explose avec son chauffeur dans l’enceinte de l’ambassade américaine de Beyrouth. Ce n’est pas seulement un attentat meurtrier de plus, mais la naissance d’une nouvelle arme dans le combat terroriste au Proche-Orient. Une dizaine d’années plus tard, le Hamas palestinien entame une campagne de terreur sans précédent contre les civils israéliens à coups de bombes humaines.
Dans ce chapitre, le professeur Ariel Merari, spécialiste mondial du terrorisme suicidaire, nous fait partager un peu de son expertise.
Viveca Hazboun, psychiatre et psychanalyste palestinienne, elle-même fille de réfugiés de 1948, a ouvert à Bethléem un centre de traitement pour les jeunes Palestiniens traumatisés par la violence et qui ne rêvent que de devenir à leur tour des « martyrs ». Sa thérapie est aussi un combat pour redonner le goût de l’espoir et faire renaître un désir de vie dans ce paysage dévasté.
Ariel Merari.  Les travaux du professeur Merari, spécialiste israélien de la violence terroriste n’ont pas été traduits en français et peu de ses livres traduits en anglais sont disponibles, sauf « On Terrorism and Combating Terrorism », University Publications of America-1985. Mais on trouvera de nombreux articles et références sur l’Internet.
Viveca Hazboun..  On trouvera sur l’Internet quelques références aux travaux de Viveca Hazboun dont cet article : « A Psychotherapeutic View of Violence »/ Advocating psychotherapeutic intervention to help children living in the shadow of violence / publié dans Palestine-Israel Journal, périodique trimestriel, vol10, n°4/2003.
Eyad El Sarraj.  Eyad El Sarraj est un psychiatre palestinien qui travaille à Gaza. Nous n’avons malheureusement pu le rencontrer pour des raisons de santé au cours de notre séjour. Il n’a pas à notre connaissance publié de livres, mais on trouvera sur l’Internet plusieurs de ses articles et interventions, dont plusieurs traduits en français. Une consultation indispensable pour comprendre la société palestinienne contemporaine, les effets de 40 années d’occupation mais plus encore les conséquences de l’extrême violence dans laquelle elle est plongée depuis l’année 2000, à Gaza en particulier.
 

Quand le Diable s’invite à la table
Le conflit israélo-palestinien, depuis ses origines, est à la fois un conflit territorial et un conflit de légitimité. Il oppose deux entités qui revendiquent un même droit, exclusif, à la souveraineté sur la Palestine mandataire. Les fondamentalistes religieux existent et de puis longtemps mais ils sont marginalisés par les forces dominantes de chaque camp. Cela vaut autant les héritiers du sionisme des origines, celui de Theodor Herzl et de David Ben Gourion, qui ont gouverné Israël pendant 30 ans, que pour le nationalisme palestinien représenté par l’OLP sous la direction de Yasser Arafat. Tout commence à changer au tournant des années 90, même on ne l’aperçoit pas encore clairement. Au sein de l’Intifada palestinienne, le courant islamiste, incarné principalement par le mouvement Hamas, né en 1987, s’affirme désormais comme une force politique majeure. Du côté israélien, l’idéologie du « Grand Israël » triomphe avec le gouvernement de Yitzhak Shamir. Un sionisme messianique prend le relais du sionisme politique à bout de souffle, avec les « hommes en noir » de l’Agoudath Israël maintenant réunis avec les partis nationalistes religieux. Les accords d’Oslo vont donner un coup d’arrêt au rêve du Grand Israël. Mais leur échec -provisoire ?- ouvre la voie à l’islamisme radical sur la scène palestinienne et toutes les données du conflit pourraient en être changées. Le Diable, autrement dit le fondamentalisme religieux risque de transformer le conflit territorial avec une guerre de religions aux conséquences imprévisibles. Pour nous accompagner dans le chapitre, le professeur Menachem Friedmam, spécialiste de la société juive orthodoxe et nous meilleurs analystes des chapitres précédents, Iossi Alpher, Zeev Sternhell et Illan Greilsammer.

Source: Moqawama.org, 16-8-2007
The full text of the victory speech given by Hizbullah Secretary General, his eminence Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah on August 14, 2007, at al-Rayah (Banner) stadium.
I take refuge in God from Satan the outcast, in the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful. Praise be to Allah, peace and prayers be upon our Lord and Seal of the Prophets Abu Kassim Mohammad the chosen and upon his infallible household, his chosen good companions and all the prophets and messengers.
My brothers and sisters oh most honorable, most generous and purest of all peoples, peace and God`s mercy and blessings be upon you.
Peace be upon you as you assemble here on this good land of earth, in the land of redemption, resistance, steadfastness, dignity and honour, the land of the Southern Dahia suburbs, the land of martyrs and resistance fighters, the enduring and God willing the victorious.
God Almighty says in his glorious book (SURAT AL-QASAS [STORIES] 4, 5, 6):
In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
"Truly Pharaoh elated himself in the land and broke up its people into sections, depressing a small group among them: their sons he slew, but he kept alive their females: for he was indeed a maker of mischief. (4) And We wished to be Gracious to those who were being depressed in the land, to make them leaders (in Faith) and make them heirs, (5) To establish a firm place for them in the land, and to show Pharaoh, Haman, and their hosts, at their hands, the very things against which they were taking precautions. (6)
The 14th of August of this year is the first anniversary of the ‘Divine Victory’, the divine empowerment and divine promise, that enables the oppressed peoples and makes them the inheritors of the earth, and to ward the tyrants off them, tyrants who slaughtered their children and destroyed their homes.
This year’s anniversary is bounded by great holy festivities for both Christians and Moslems in Lebanon and the world.
This victory anniversary comes, just after the anniversary of the prophet`s Ascension (Israe’a wal Mi’raage), the day the Seal of the Prophets was ascended from the Al-Aqsa Sacred Mosque, from al-Quds (Jerusalem) to the heavens. It also falls on the anniversary of the delivery of the noble prophecy, when God sent his messenger, as mercy to the worlds, bearer of good news and harbinger.
This event today also falls on the anniversary of the birth of the grandson of the Prophet of God, lord of the martyrs Abi Abdullah Hussein (Peace be upon him), the ever rejecting injustice-leader, who taught us how to be in the arena, how to sacrifice and fight with our souls, sons and loved ones.
Also coincides with this anniversary the birth of Ali Bin Hussein Zine El Abidine (pbuh), the captive of Karbala, who taught us how to stand firm in the face of shackles, restrictions and torturers, and we will continue to speak a truth from which we will not budge an iota.
The birth of Abi Fadle al-Abbas (pbuh) also falls on this anniversary, the warrior and wounded soldier whose wounds did not hold him back from continuing his fight in defense of the cause, the leader, the sanctities and sanctums.
Also currently celebrated by the Christians of Lebanon and the world along with this anniversary is the transition of Virgin Mary, Our Holy Lady (pbuh).
These blessed anniversaries for Christians, Muslims and followers of heavenly religions bless the anniversary of our victory on the 14th of August.
Dear brothers and sisters,
Today, through you and through the Southern Dahia suburb, the enduring, steadfast and struggling for freedom, I wish to address the people of Lebanon, the peoples of the Arab and Islamic world, and all the peoples of the world.
First of all to thank the leaders, scholars, rulers, governments, nations and parties, forces of influence, movements, groups, associations, personalities, individuals and all those who stood by Lebanon and its resistance in the face of the July aggression, the American-"Israeli" aggression against Lebanon, against the people of Lebanon and the entire nation.
I also give thanks to all those who lent a helping hand after the war, in helping rebuild what was demolished, heal the wounds, wipe the tears and stand proud in the face of the coming challenges.
Dear brothers and sisters:
In the speeches of the previous evenings I talked about the goals, results and field events, as well as some of the political realities, but today my talk is about the people, the people of Lebanon, the resistance public, the peoples of the Arab and Islamic worlds and about all free people who stood in this battle and were among its elements of strength, steadfastness and ultimately among its elements of victory.
Here I will talk:
-First to the peoples of our Arab and Islamic worlds.
-Secondly, to the people of Lebanon and about what took place during the war with the people of Lebanon.
-Thirdly: to the resistance audience, hence briefly touch on the local situation and the reconstruction portfolio
- Then conclude with the prospects of the next phase, where the Zionists and the Americans are beating the drums of war, about the position and what we must do.
These are the titles of my speech tonight, I hope it finds enough time God willing, and accommodation in your big, great and loving hearts.
Dear brothers and sisters,
When this battle began, the United States and "Israel" tried to isolate the resistance and its public from the peoples of our Arab and Islamic worlds as well as the rest of the people and movements in Lebanon.
1- The political discourse and the mega-media owned by America and "Israel" in the world specifically focused on several titles in order to achieve this alienation, thus keep the resistance and its public alone in the face of this cruel and violent war.
First, they focused on the `terrorism` charge which they worked on it for many years. They might have affected some countries in the western world but no longer affecting the peoples of the Arab and Islamic worlds, or our people in Lebanon. This terrorism charge, for which they have employed all the media, incitement channels and diplomatic effort, began to break even in Europe and in many places; and we challenged them on it.
Today again, I challenge them to hold an international conference to identify a single definition of `terrorism`, to know whether the resistance in Lebanon is `terrorism`, whether it is correct to classify it as `terrorism`.
I say to you that despite the appeal by many of the world`s Governments and peoples, they did not act, because the United States knows very well that any definition put forward for `terrorism`, would apply to the United States as a terrorist state, and will apply to "Israel" as a `terrorist` entity. Therefore, they always avoid defining `terrorism`.
This did not work on the peoples of the Arab and Islamic worlds. On the contrary, people of the Arab and Muslim worlds rather know that America and "Israel" are the terrorists, and that the resistance movements are honest, clean and humane movements defending the right of their homelands and nation to exist in freedom, sovereignty, dignity and independence.
2- They went to say and strongly promote that this war is between "Israel" and an Iranian-Syrian tool, that it is a regional war with nothing to do with Lebanon, its fate as a homeland and as a people nor with the fates of the Arabs and Muslims on larger scale; that Hizbullah objective of the war is to disrupt the International Tribunal or to provide assistance to the Iranian nuclear file.
They worked on this issue in Lebanon and the world from the first day.
Even this claim collapsed before the large and main declared objectives, spoken about by Ehud Olmert at the beginning of the war, along with the goals announced by Condoleezza Rice.
And the world knew that this war against Lebanon and the Lebanese resistance, that it was to subjugate Lebanon to implement resolution 1559 in order to attach Lebanon to the American-Zionist project, and that it was to pave the way for the auspicious-birth of a new Middle East, a threat to all countries and peoples of the region.
So, since this accusation fell by the wayside, they went to the third accusation, a most dangerous and most malicious ever, they went to the sectarian subject.
They talked to Arabs and Muslims, to Christians and Muslims.
They said to the Christians: `this battle is against an Islamic group, and it has nothing to do with you nor does it target you`.
To the Sunni Muslims they said: `this battle is with a Shiite group, it targets a `Shiite project` and the `Shiite crescent`, etc. ...
They tried to concentrate on the sectarian and denominational titles. They even procured Fatwas (religious rulings) that even went so far as to question `if it is permissible to pray for the Lebanese resistance to be victorious?!`
Even the legitimacy of praying for victory was placed under question, not to mention demonstrating in to support of the resistance, or providing it with money, political support, material support or simply stand by its side.
Here, just frankly imagine opening the file of religious factionalism and sectarianism in the face of the resistance in Lebanon … and when? During the confrontation of the most extreme, violent and longest "Israeli"-Arab war, the Sixth war against an Arab country.
They wanted to drag the matter to the narrow and very limited circle, but with the grace of God Almighty, and the credit here goes back to the senior Sunni Muslim clergy and scholars in Lebanon and throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds, it goes to the leaders of the Islamic movements, thinkers and Politicians, both Muslims and Christians, who stood in the face of this rift, and persisted with stressing the national, Arab nationalist, Islamic and humanitarian dimension of this battle and confrontation.
Thanks also to the wise minds, courageous and sincere voices with whom we managed to thwart this sedition the Americans and the Zionists wanted. We saw demonstrations, sit-ins and positions taken throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds. We saw activities by Muslims and Christians, Shiites, Sunnis and Druze, and followers of different Islamic sects in support of the resistance.
Here, I must specify how I ought to define the thanks to all these minds, pens and voices, which addressed and tackled the seditious attempt, and the attempt to besiege the resistance in service to the Zionist enemy and the US in the region.
In reality, we did not expect more than this amount of sympathy and moral, political and psychological support from the peoples of the Arab and Islamic world.
We are realists and we know everyone`s circumstances. We did not ask for more than this. Oh Arab and Islamic peoples, O all you free people of the world, O Muslims, and Christians who stood by us, we cherish and honour your moral support. We prize your love and prayer.
Even after the victory, they wanted to circumvent it and disrupt its effects in Lebanon and the Arab and Muslim worlds, because the resistance defeated "Israel" and smashed its myth through this longest and heaviest of "Israeli" wars.
Because the resistance resurrected and re-ignited the spirit of hope, confidence and enthusiasm, because the resistance in Lebanon provided an actual alternative to liberate the land and defend the homeland, a substitute for humiliating negotiations imposed by American and "Israeli" conditions on governments and peoples, because the peoples of the world, Arab, Islamic and rest of the world regarded the resistance of Lebanon with high ranking and high symbolism.
They wanted to besiege and isolate the resistance again. So, again the focus was returned to the sectarian dimension, and attempts were made whenever they admitted to the victory, to paint it as a victory for a party or a religious group, and I assure you, as I said on August 14, of 2006, that this victory is for Lebanon, all of Lebanon, the Arabs, all Arabs, Muslims, all Muslims and for the free of the world.
They want us torn apart, divided in war and in battle, country by country, a people at a time, a religion at a time, faction by faction and party by party.
This is their plot, when we are segregated, in dispute, when some resist and others abandon them, they will prevail and we will be defeated.
As for us, in the war we said we fight on behalf of the entire nation, and some have tried to wrongly explain my words, and I said if we won the July war, it would be a victory for Lebanon and the entire nation, and if we lost it would b a defeat for Lebanon and the entire nation.
Had we been defeated in Lebanon imagine the fate Lebanon would have been in?
Would Lebanon be enjoying peace and stability, or would it be pushed into civil war?
Will it be turned to absolute American-"Israeli" control?
What will be the fate of the Palestinian cause? How about the Palestinian people?
What will be the fate of Syria, Iraq and even Jordan, which will be turned to an alternative State?
Even Saudi Arabia, which will be torn apart within the framework of a new Middle East?
What of Egypt even? And so on and so forth…
The New Middle East, which was declared at the beginning of the war, had it succeeded what fate would the region have today?
Had it succeeded, regrettably the Iraqi model of fighting, conflict, schisms and sectarianism would be the dominant model in the region’s countries.
With you we aborted this new Middle East, but they will attempt to revive it again. This is the point I want to conclude with as I address the Arab and Islamic worlds, before I come to address the Lebanese people.
Dear fellow Arabs and Muslims, dear Lebanese:
The Middle East project is originally an old project that dates back to the beginnings of the last century.
To verify this assertion listen to this script.
Theodor Herzl, founder of World Zionism wrote in 1897 in his diary: “A Middle East Commonwealth must be established”, which means there has been talk of a New Middle East since the late 1800, where there is no Arab or Islamic Worlds, but a New Middle East. “Within which the Jewish State”, Herzl says and not me “Jewish has an effective leadership standing, and a leading economic role, it would be the centre to attract investments, scientific research and expertise.”
Moreover, in 1907 published in London in the Campbell Benauman report, the then Minister of English colonies, which he submitted in a conference convened by a group of scholars of history, politics and economics with a number of European politicians during which the situation in the Arab region was discussed.
Look at the text in this report’s recommendation, worked on by Britain and Western countries and later inherited by America to which it renews its commitment with each passing phase.
The text appeared as follows: “the danger on the west lies in the Mediterranean Sea because of the interface it represents between East and West, on whose Southern and Eastern coasts lives one people that shares a unified history and language”; meaning the Arabic language and geography; “as well as all aspects of assembly and interdependence, with their revolutionary tendencies,” meaning not a dormant or subservient people; “and with large natural sources of wealth.”
The report also wondered as to “the fate of the region should education and culture spread”.
So you can see over the past decades the planning imposed even on our rulers to disallow the spread of education and culture, and for the majority to remain illiterate and ignorant, unable to learn and develop.
The report went on to answer that “should the spread of education occur, it will represent a knockout to the existing empires.”
The mentioned colonial Conference put in place schemes and ways to weaken this region and its peoples and facilitate the control and containment of its coasts and the containment of the will of their peoples, along with their resources and wealth to prevent their development, progress and unity.
He identified two main methods:
1- The first and very important thing comes in the formation of an alien human barrier so strange that it remains separate from the structure of this nation and strong so that it can achieve the goal of separating the easterly Arab states from al-Maghreb (westerly) states. The establishment of a force near the Suez Canal that is an enemy of the peoples of the region and friendly to the West.
So, the establishment of the strong state of "Israel" at this location, not because Palestine is the promised land, but because Palestine is the natural barrier between the eastern and western sectors of the nation, overlooking the coasts, the Suez Canal and the oil rich fields, this is first.
2- Second: Here religion, religious feelings and hopes are subjugated to serve the colonial project, employed in the fragmentation of the Arab world into states and multiple entities, which is what happened thus far.
The will of the nation, resistance movements and the aware peoples frustrated them each time they attempted to establish a New Middle East. Then, a time passes before they return again to the ‘New Middle East’ project.
Today, we thwarted this birth, but this does not mean that the Americans, the heirs of the old colonialism, will not re-attempt to fragment our world, to tear apart what is already fractured, and divide what is divided, but this time not on the basis of geography but the basis of sectarian, factional and ethnic basis, to leave them in dispute with one another, weakened by fighting among themselves to be ruled by a mighty "Israel", where America forms the only regional guarantor of civil liberties, ethnic and religious minorities.
Here, we need no mistakes in diagnosing the situation nor in diagnosing the enemy, the friend nor in the setting of priorities, where some collaborators, fools and madmen attempt to assist the original plotters in tearing up this nation and its peoples for the benefit of this project.
This requires that we stay together, together in this battle and in all arenas, to join forces and hands, to refuse whatever may divide us whether religious, as Muslims and Christians of the region, or on sectarian, denominational or ethnic basis, for we, the peoples of this region are its native landholders. We are this area’s real people, it is our natural, legitimate and legal right to live here freely in sovereignty and to enjoy our natural wealth, away from any looting, control or outside domination.
Now, I move onto the second title, to the people of Lebanon, also the proud and loyal in this battle, who was also one of the surprises of the July 2006 war.
In spite of the sharp divisions that existed or still exist, and there is nothing new about that, despite the political climate and media storm that occurred in the beginning of the war and continued during and after the war, what did the Zionists do?
As I said they focused their campaign trying to claim that the problem lies directly with the resistance environment, meaning with the Shiites in Lebanon. So, they attacked the towns, villages, markets, and all places. They displaced more than one million human beings.
When those are forced out of their homes in Lebanon and to Syria as the only neighboring country, under the existing divisions and sensitivities, the plan was for them to clash with the rest of the Lebanese population.
The "Israelis" and Americans expected the sensitivities in Lebanon to prevent the rest of the Lebanese from embracing the displaced, who will in turn be pushed to commit errors. Hence, a civil war will break out, which they were betting on.
But what actually happened?
The rest of the Lebanese sects, religions and movements received the displaced regardless of the political position and party affiliation. All the Lebanese acted humanely, ethically and with a high sense of patriotism. Yes, there was an odd case here and there in the capital Beirut in Mount Lebanon in the north in the Bekaa and in the rest of the south, but not worth mentioning.
Syria too, when the Syrians embraced the displaced they did not discriminate nor were they affected by atmosphere that had previously prevailed in Lebanon. They did not discriminate by sect or religious denomination that had been stirred earlier.
The displaced acted responsibility too, except in incidents also not worth mentioning. They acted responsibly, with a very high nationalist spirit.
Here was the embrace and the surprise. The United States and "Israel" waited for the towns and villages where the displaced went to burst in flames. Yet, the surprise was that the Lebanese accepted each other lovingly, sincerely and honestly.
Here and with all my heart I say to all the Lebanese, communities and movements, both institutions and societies, also the brothers in Syria, as leadership and a people who embraced each displaced person during the 34 day, I tell them that this embracing surprised our enemy and your enemy, and formed a significant component of strength for the resistance fighters and public, which led to making the victory.
Even after the victory and after this moral and humanitarian epic was expressed by the Lebanese socially and domestically, they tried to besiege this victory after the war and disrupt its effects and traces on the internal level, and I do not want to go into all aspects of this topic, but I will address one.
After the victory we stood and said this is a victory for Lebanon and the people of Lebanon, all of Lebanon. They came to play the game of intimidation between the faiths to instill fear between them.
Unfortunately, some leaders in Lebanon with no political plan, without ideology nor persuasion or a civilized thought, unable to accommodate a large group of people, they work through his/their religious denomination by raising their fear from other religions to strengthen his/their control over them.
This is happening in Lebanon and among all Lebanese religious denominations. There is someone without a political project, speech or literature within their religion except only to frighten his/their own people from others.
Now, precisely because of this trend, where they frighten others from the Shiite community in Lebanon, specifically from the Amal-Hizbullah alliance, from the resistance weapon and the like. They worked on this as they are still doing.
Today, we can frankly and clearly find in the Lebanese arena two leadership paths. Here, I am not talking about loyalists and opposition, but about two different paths:
- One being a path of conciliation believes in accord and unity that invites for building bridges, spreading of understanding, calls for the convergence of Lebanese, for internal settlement and to reach internal settlements on all internal issues over which we differ as Lebanese.
- Another being one of confrontation, domineering and intimidation, makes their position stronger by leaning on the American and international community, a path that considers a national partnership suicide, and internal settlement a betrayal deserving the death penalty.
This is the reality in Lebanon today; of course, we call for mutual understanding, extending of bridges to converge onto internal settlements.
Note this difference, to reach a settlement with the enemy some say let the captives stay in the "Israeli" prisons, and actually said this; they said let occupied Shibaa Farms and Kafr Shuba hills remain as they are, and they said that too.
They want to form a settlement with the "Israelis", at the expense of our occupied land and our prisoners in jails, our sovereignty and our future, something they do not see as treason!
Yet, a settlement between the Lebanese to come together, create understanding and cooperation to build one’s country is seen as treason, deserving the death punishment!
Alas, this is due to this methodology of intimidation, where some constantly place us in the position of the accused, who must defend themselves, always demanded to reassure the Lebanese and Lebanon, that is everyday and in every speech I must stand and speak for co-existence, civil peace, the Taif Accord, the unity of the Lebanese and that we have no undeclared goals or ulterior motives, nor a ‘three way power sharing’ of government etc…
I mean must I every day and in every speech re-iterate, as we constantly do, that we stand for co-existence, civil peace, the Taif Agreement, the unity of the Lebanese and that we have no hidden Goals or ulterior motives, that we do not want to take control of the government?
In fact, if one should ask for reassurances since year 2000, and again as was confirmed by what happened in 2006, in addition to what preceded in resolution 1559, the war that followed it, the threats and intimidations that ensued, all that places the resistance and its public in a position where it must be given assurances because it is the one targeted with murder, assassination, mass deportation and demographic change ...
We are tired of this discourse, and what to say, what additional reassurances do we provide?
We have provided everything we can. Our intentions are openly declared. Our conduct is evidently clear. Today nearing the birth of Imam Hussein (pbuh) I can only say a word said by Hussein (pbuh) himself: “he who accepts us as it is the truth, thus God is most worthy of truth; and he who rejects us, then we be patient until God judges between us and our people" then this is the honest truth we declare, these are our intentions and this is our conduct….
I mean what more than that could we do?!
In any case, this trend is a threat to Lebanon. The Americans work hard on this trend of intimidation, segmentation, slicing and raising of doubts and suspicions between sects and Lebanese forces, to introduce themselves as protector and guarantor, as is the case in Iraq.
But O Lebanese, do we not take a lesson and a warning from Iraq?
Has America in Iraq been able to be a protector of Christians?
And where are the Christians in Iraq today?
Has is it been able to be a protector of the Shiites or the Sunnis? And where are the Shiites and Sunnis today?
Was it able to protect the Turkmen or Kurds?
This is the lesson.
Should we return to ourselves or listen to those who meddle in our midst every day and night to disrupt any internal settlement?
Yes, we will once again support an internal settlement, the entrance to which is through a partnership government, away from all the erroneous and unjust interpretations given by some on the formation of a national unity government. Today, the renewed endeavours at reaching a compromise and conciliation are being conducted by the Parliamentary Speaker, and brother Nabih Berri to solve the crisis.
We affirm our support and cooperation with all the initiatives put forward, but who is it continues to declare sharing governing as suicide? Who is it that calls any settlement as an act of treason?
He who makes these declarations is clearly telling the Lebanese and the world who is responsible for closing doors – not us –he who disrupts settlements and initiatives, who insists on not forming a national unity government, on holding elections without constitutional quorum to bring in a President to be used to impose a government on the Lebanese.
Where can this situation push Lebanon to?!
The Lebanese here in politics are invited to a humanitarian, moral and ethical stance akin to the social position they took in the war days. This time not to embrace and save the displaced, but to save the nation and the entire people of Lebanon.
Third: I come to address the resistance community and its public to say that here was a targeting of the most serious, harshest, most violent and most painful one. Here laid the gamble wagered by the Americans and "Israelis", together with their researches and wrong information.
Their gamble was this: ‘if we came to Lebanon, kept aside other Lebanese communities, and focused on the Shiites by destroying their towns, villages, markets, religious institutions, schools and enterprises -of course the bombing touched everyone but clearly the focus was here- if they killed their women and children’.
This means that the destruction was deliberate, the killing of women and children was intentional, and bombing markets and businesses was on purpose.
The objective was the destruction of the infrastructure of the humanitarian, social and economic environment which preserves the resistance or produces it. That was deliberate, therefore, we find, for example, in the southern Dahiya suburb entire neighborhoods destroyed!
Were missiles being launched from al-Dahiya?! No, nothing came from al-Dahiya.
Many of these buildings did not contain even Hizbullah centers, but still they were destroyed. Entire towns and villages were destroyed in the south. Large numbers of houses demolished in the Bekaa and the North and elsewhere.
Why all this?
First, to punish the resistance community, and therefore to say to the Lebanese people and all peoples of the Arab world ‘this will be the punishment and reward for whoever supports, produces and embraces the resistance’.
Secondly, to incite the public against the resistance, to emerge in demonstrations and verbally abuse it, to detract from its stance, to question its path and leadership, to demand its surrender, to hand over its weapon and to say ‘enough, we cannot take it anymore, enough homes destroyed, enough women and children killed, we have given more than we can bear, enough is enough.’
Thus you notice many of the local, and unfortunately Arab and academic media alongside much of the political discourse tried to focus on this aspect. It is true that the sacrifices and the losses were great, but they worked on increasing it out of proportion by two and three fold, to erode the will, consciousness, faith, determination and embrace of the public behind the resistance.
That is what happened, but here we found the greater surprises by the resistance community. How did the resistance public deal with this harsher, most violent and most painful aspect of this war?
How did the people deal with this abuse in the Dahiya, the South, the Bekaa and other areas?
You and I do not forget the pictures of women who stayed back in the frontier villages carrying knives and boiling oil preparing to fight the occupation soldiers. This is our people, this is our public.
How did the displaced behave, how did they express their faith, hope and affection, while the whole world failed to capture even one wrong scene of the displaced, despite the harsh living conditions.
What was the behaviour of the families of the martyrs, the wounded, and those whose homes and livelihoods were destroyed?
They simply said “Fida al-Moqawama" ‘sacrifice toward the resistance’.
Yes, we, eastern people focus on the symbol and some faulted us when they were saying, “Fida e-Sayyed Hassan” ‘sacrifice toward Sayyed Hassan’, which is an emotional and sentimental expression with no basis in our culture.
You are not a sacrifice for a person, but you know as well as the families of the martyrs, the wounded, the prisoners and those whose homes were destroyed know that Sayyed Hassan himself, his soul, and his children are ready sacrifices toward you.
Then came the startling, surprising and unprecedented stand in the history of warfare. I searched this in depth during two weeks and did not find a precedent of a people or popular group who were displaced, whose homes destroyed, who were murdered, massacres committed against them, cluster bombs filled their fields and farms, with no cease-fire announced yet, yet upon hearing that there is a ‘halt of hostile activities’ at eight o’clock and at exactly eight their wheels start turning for the return trip, hundreds of thousands of displaced persons begin to head back to the Dahyia, to the South, the Bekaa and to all the villages and towns in Lebanon.
Here was the real victory and the culmination of the real triumph.
When the displaced people prepared for their return, they were told: to where do you return? To your houses, you no longer have homes to dwell in.
And they responded: ‘we return to our villages and put in place tents and inhabit them rather than remain displaced.’
They were told ‘more than a million cluster bombs were scattered in your fields, houses, farms and roads, and it will kill your children, it will explode under you.
They replied: ‘we will go back to our villages, towns and die under the olive tree, near our tobacco plant and would not remain displaced.
You were told: ‘to where do return and the war is not over yet, nor a ceasefire has been declared?’
You said the word of the self-assured ‘we defeated them and they will not dare do anything’.
You also returned as promised, as was your confidence and hope.
You returned home tall, heads high without favour from anyone and with the grace of God Almighty and the blessings of the blood of your martyrs.
The whole world saw hundreds of thousands return within one day, smiles on their faces, covering their tears and pain, declaring their hope, feeling proud and dignified with their victory.
Dear brothers, O Lebanese, O world,
After this epic legendary scene, that is unprecedented in history, do not such a people deserve to be called ‘most honourable, most pure and most kind’ of all people?
This stance taken towards the resistance community and its public is not incidental but a deep and rooted one whose credit goes back to the grand clergy and their culture, thought and unified position, credit too goes also to this historic and strategic alliance between Amal Movement and Hizbullah in Lebanon, and this awareness and maturity is the result of experience and suffering.
Today, the resistance community along with what it possesses and embraces of culture, wisdom and awareness, with this embrace by the Lebanese in the background and the shared understanding, the mutual love and established bridges form a cornerstone of this victory and a pillar of steadfastness.
One of the senior Zionist experts said: “what is the real question ‘Israel’ is facing with?”
The question is no longer on whether "Israel" lost its ability to deter or that "Israel" has failed to demoralize the opponent’s moral, this ended. But this expert says “if this opponent enjoys morale that is the highest since the establishment of ‘Israel’ until now," the question is then: “can ‘Israel’ in truth launch any war again?!”
Hence, he is looking at your confidence that remains intact.
Yes, this is the grass-roots level that is strong, sacrificing, faithful, conscious and rational on which the resistance is founded, a base the resistance still depends on in all its challenges. Therefore, as I said in the first days of the war in July, through trusting in God and my knowledge of you and of this people, and these resistance fighters and this enemy and as I used to always promise you victory, again I promise you victory now.
On the 14th of August, I promised you a good return.
Here, I will open the file of reconstruction, compensation and assistance. I will brief you with my report of what we did in the last year.
Certainly, there are countries, governments, and sides that made great efforts, I thank them for that.
Before and after the Lebanese government lost its legitimacy the government did something, but we all express irritation of this lag. I do not want to touch on this aspect, but I want to present my report:
Ever since August 14, we have tried to be in service of the displaced, the owners of destroyed and damaged homes, owners of institutions in general. I shall mention that what is provided is not considered compensation, but contributions and assistance to heal the wounds.
Compensation must be paid by the State. The State received nearly $ 1 billion to help those affected by the war. This $ 1 billion is the minimum right of the people and must be given to them. What we have done by ourselves, is paid money from a brother to his brother away from legal and official responsibilities. Therefore, it did not exempt the State from providing compensation in the same areas:
First: we started with what was called the "Accommodation file"
This means securing annual rent and house furniture so that no one is left in the street, and thank God for the accomplishment of this file, no one is left on the street. They wanted more than 25 thousand families at the minimum to remain in the streets, but the effort and cooperation with our friends and allies in the political and national forces in different regions, associations, we were able to accomplish this file quickly, including 28 thousand and 300 cases to the value of 133 million and 500 thousand dollars.
Second: repairing damaged houses, other than the houses that were destroyed
The damaged houses which were supposed to be restored -with the exception of the four towns adopted by the State of Qatar, thankfully- in remaining villages, towns and regions received in payments for 113 cases and 820 housing units so far to the value of 190 million and 700 thousand dollars.
Of course, the restoration file is not completed until now, which means there are buildings that will not be brought down, therefore will now be listed for restoration.
In some cases, there are shared sections in the Dahiya where work is still ongoing.
Third: assisting the economic and trade firms and institutions
This type of assistance I will talk about now is, in fact, a contribution and not compensation, and secondly a percentage is marked within it, i.e. we gave priority to homes to return to housing. What we presented is contribution and assistance for direct damages, and not indirect, and this file remains open. We are still trying to secure a communication to improve some of these contributions.
In the economic and trade institutions 12,500 cases worth $30 million
Helping direct agricultural damages to 1,300 cases worth $2 million
Assistance with direct animal damages, 2,000 cases, to the value of 3 million dollars
Assistance for public vehicles which are a source of livelihood, public taxi vehicle, a bulldozer and 2,300 cases worth $4 million.
Support to stricken villages, whose conditions were extremely harsh, $3 million
In order to launch the reconstruction project in southern Dahiya and not have to wait for anyone hoping they would join us later on in the process, $14 million have been paid so far through WAAD reconstruction project,
Support extended to fishermen 3500 cases, to the value of $700,000.
The total amount spent so far is $380,900,000 dollars, ‘now some get upset’ when I say ‘this money is Halal, legitimate and comes without political conditions.’
There are two points I want to stress before I move to the last section:
1- Regarding the subject of demolished homes that has not been treated yet, there exists a delay, and since the state has taken money and has received money to restore these demolished houses, we committed ourselves to pay the difference.
Even in the southern Dahiya, I was clear when I said ‘we and the people’ with the money they will receive as compensation from the State we will build the southern Dahiya. I did not say we alone from our funds alone will build the southern Dahiya. Therefore, the lag in the payment of compensation for demolished homes, led to the delay in the reconstruction of houses in all areas.
Considering that these families still have no homes to go back to, I declare to you that God willing we will again renew our contribution to all families who rented houses for periods ranging from one month to a year, hoping all the reconstruction of all demolished houses would be completed during this year, and we will not need to repeat this process later.
But to avoid any confusion or ambiguities, I want to emphasize that this contribution is for the actual tenant.
The actual tenant is the rent payer. Should the tenant still has a month, two or three or a year delay, we are committed God willing to rent contribution from a month to a year, so that no one goes to the street, nor incur the financial consequences of the delay in rebuilding the destroyed house so far.
Here, I must mention efforts spent by your brothers in the resistance, the Mujahideen, who have worked since the first days on dismantling and exploding cluster bombs especially in the habilitated villages. They were able within a few months of the cessation of hostilities to dismantle and explode 40,000 cluster bombs, offering in this process five dear martyrs from the Islamic Resistance fighters.
I reach the last section, to the position that we must deal with responsibly;
Since the end of the war, there is talk of whether we have seen the end of the "Israeli" wars on Lebanon?
Will we enjoy peace and security and not face a new war again?
Some people said that, and provided their strategic, political, security, military and psychological reading, and so on.
Some people say no. "Israel" will not acquiesce in defeat. It will work to regain its reputation, its ability of deterrence and prestige in the region because if it does not do so, it will be putting itself on the road to extinction; along with this reading those people also provide a strategic, political, military and security reading.
I do not want to enter into this debate to say yes or no, but I want to talk about a responsibility and remind of two matters:
1- First, that in our midst is an enemy whose nature is aggression with historic ambitions for our land, waters and natural wealth. Its plan is based on the logic of force, bullying, frightening and spooking others, where now it is the one spooked.
This is our enemy and this is its nature.
2-The second thing is, we cannot rely on the analysis to say there will be no war. Hence, rest easy and sleep on soft silk.
I do not say THERE WILL BE a war, God willing there is no war.
We, as I said in previous speeches do not want war. We did not even want the July war. they wanted this war for which they placed objectives on the level of the Middle East as a whole, and it was they who pushed the situation into this direction.
In all cases, precaution is our duty, thank God if no war erupts, for ‘and enough is God for the believers in their fight’, and if God forbid Lebanon was faced with a new challenge we would be able to meet this challenge. However, I tell you that preparedness and preparations for war, are the most important means of war prevention. This is what is called a balance of terror and deterrence.
From year 2000 to 2006, that which protected Lebanon and South Lebanon is this balance, because Barak and Sharon were committed to this balance. 2006 war, due to Olmert’s stupidity, and because he is carrying out an American decision where the decision to go to is not his, since the issue expands beyond the question of Lebanon and southern Lebanon to building a ‘New Middle East’ and remapping the region.
Hence, when our enemy understands, and we make him understand that we have the strength to confront, and stand firm, even the strength to win, this will stop and deter him from launching a new war. At the minimum level, it will make him very much hesitate before launching a war of this kind.
This is why when I spoke in a newspaper interview early on of the celebration days that the resistance possesses missiles able to hit every point in occupied Palestine, I was not trying to lure a war, but I worked to prevent one, because by that I am saying to the "Israeli" government, army and people that they must understand that any future war on Lebanon will cost them dearly.
We also learned from the July war experience, and made the required evaluation, discovered our strengths and weaknesses and those of the enemy’s and worked on them, and therefore in an upcoming war, the enemy must know that they will pay very dearly.
I tell the enemy this so they do not think of war.
Some say “you exercise psychological warfare”, true, and this is a part of the battle.
But I exercise honest psychological warfare. I am talking about facts and not lies. I am talking about truths. When the war started and I told them ‘if you want to go to an all out war, then, we will too and I promise you surprises”. It is true this was psychological warfare, but a truthful psychological warfare that was not based on lies.
The surprises came through the sea, when we hit their battle ship, the pride of the "Israeli" marine industry Saar 5. The surprise came also when we destroyed their Merkava IV-generation in the valleys, hills and entrances to villages. There was a surprise when our Mujahidin downed their helicopters in the night and day as well. The surprises continued when they were unable to destroy our rockets and we in turn were able to bomb their interior for the first time in “Israel`s” history over the entire 33 days without interruption. We surprised them with our command and control network. We surprised them with our public and resistance community the most honourable of people, with the Lebanese people, with the peoples of the Arab and Islamic nations and there was victory.
Today, I want to conclude the celebrations of this anniversary, and by the way I would like to thank all who joined us in this commemoration and this victory.
I want to conclude this ceremony and celebrations with a clear promise. Take it as psychological warfare if you like, but an honest psychological war, that if you ("Israelis") are to think of attacking Lebanon, and I do not advise you on this, should you think of declaring war on Lebanon, I will not promise you surprises like the previous ones, but I promise you the Great surprise that can change the fate of the war and the fate of the region God willing.
With this commitment, I place a substantial responsibility on myself and on the resistance. This commitment is an actual commitment. Now, I am not talking about anything related to the future. They themselves (“Israelis”) must analyze. I will not tell you nor tell them, because if I said what this thing is, it will not remain a surprise.
With the resistance I hold this commitment in order to protect Lebanon and the people of Lebanon, and should war breakout, God forbid -and again I repeat that we do not want war, we do not want it- we must be ready, as a resistance, as an army, as a people, as a State.
Yesterday, we all heard the commander of the Lebanese Army say that so far all the Lebanese Army has been provided with is promises, talk and some ammunition which had been paid for. I say paid for from the funds of the Lebanese people.
There is a ban on arming the Lebanese army until it removes ‘“Israel” is the enemy’ from its nationalistic creed. America has never given nor will it allow anyone give the Lebanese army what enables it to defend Lebanon, but the resistance stands alongside the national Lebanese army, its fighters alongside their soldiers, its martyrs along with the army’s, its vigor alongside their’s, and together with the people of Lebanon we will face this challenge.
God willing as we triumphed in May 2000, in August 2006, I forewarn and advise them ("Israelis") that here in Lebanon, resistance, army and people, are all a part of a nation that refuses subservience, rejects humiliation, only afraid of God, only kneels to Him, a nation that fights, every ready to sacrifice and win the decisive historic victory, God willing.
Again through trusting in God, my knowing of you, this people, the fighters of this resistance movement and this cowardly and lowly enemy, who is more fragile than a spider`s web, as I always promise you victory, I promise you victory again.